Note for translation: inspired by C. D. C. Reeve, I reworked Socrates’ reported speech into direct conversation between him and Glaucon.

Socrates: Not at all, but even you, ask. Assuredly you have not seldom heard it, but now either you do not recognize or in turn you intend to cause trouble for me by attacking. But I think the latter more. Since you have very often heard that, at any rate, the form of the good is a greatest learning, which, in fact, since both just things and the other things using, they become useful and beneficial. And now perhaps you know that I am about to say this thing, and in addition to this, that we do not sufficiently know it; and if we do not know, and without this thing, if we should know the other things as much as possible, you know that nothing is help to us, just as if we have not even acquired anything without the good. Or do you think that to have acquired every acquisition, however not the good, is somehow more? Or to understand all the other things without the good, and to understand nothing beautiful and good?

Glaucon: By Zeus, I do not, at any rate.

Socrates: But indeed you also know this thing, at any rate, namely that the good seems to be pleasure in the eyes of the many men, on the one hand, wisdom in the eyes of the more refined ones, on the other hand.

Glaucon: And how not?

Socrates: And that, at any rate, dear one, the men believing the latter are not able to show what wisdom is, but they are compelled to say, since bringing about the wisdom of the good.

Glaucon: And much absurdly.

Socrates: For how not, if, although making a reproach at any rate that we do not know the good, they say again on the grounds of us knowing? For they say that the good is wisdom of the good, on the grounds of us understanding in turn what they say, when they call the name of the good.

Glaucon: Most truly.

Socrates: And what about the men determining the pleasure as good? Surely it is not something characteristic of a lesser mistake for a man quite full of the different things? Or aren’t even these men compelled to admit that there are evil pleasures?

Glaucon: Very much so.

Socrates: In fact, as I think, it happens for them to agree that the same things are good and bad. Isn’t it so?

Glaucon: Certainly.

Socrates: Accordingly, it is visible that, on the one hand, there are many great controversies concerning it?

Glaucon: For how not?

Socrates: Why, on the other hand? Isn’t this thing also clear, namely that many men would prefer the things seemingly to be just, on the one hand, and beautiful, even if they should not be, nevertheless, they would prefer to do and have acquired and suppose these things; it is sufficient for no one to acquire the things seeming to be good, on the other hand, but they seek the things being, and here now everyone holds in no honor the semblance.

Glaucon: And very much so.

Socrates: In fact, the thing which quite every soul pursues, on the one hand, and does everything on account of this, although divining by instinct that it is something, since being at a loss, on the other hand, and not being able to take sufficiently what it ever is nor to use a stable faith, the sort which the soul uses also concerning the other things, and on account of this, it fails in gaining even the other things, if there were any help. Concerning, in fact, that sort of thing and so much a thing, are we to say in this way that it is necessary for even those best men in the city to have been in darkness, to whom we will entrust everything?

Glaucon: Not at all.

Socrates: At least then as I think, if just things and beautiful things not being recognized in what sort of way they ever are good, it would not be worthy of something much to have acquired a guardian of themselves, the man not recognizing this thing; but I prophesy that no one will earlier recognize them sufficiently.

Glaucon: For you prophesy well.

Socrates: Accordingly, the civil polity will have been completely ordered for us, if that sort of man inspects it as a guardian, the man acquainted with these things?

Glaucon: Necessarily. But in fact, Socrates, do you say that the good is knowledge or pleasure, or some other thing in addition to these?

Socrates: O this man, you were long ago well clear in sight that the thing appearing to the others about them will not be sufficient for you.

Glaucon: For not even does it seem to me to be just, Socrates, to be able to speak about the beliefs of the other men, on the one hand, not to speak the belief of himself, on the other hand, although busying yourself for so much time concerning these things.

Socrates: But why? Does it seem to you to be just to speak about things which someone does not know, on the grounds of him knowing?

Glaucon: In no way on the grounds of him knowing. However, on the grounds of him thinking that he is willing to speak about these things which he thinks.

Socrates: But why? Have you not perceived the opinions without knowledge, that all are blind? Of which the best ones are blind— or do the men holding an opinion about some true thing without mind somehow seem to you to differ from blind men, although going over a road correctly?

Glaucon: In no way.

Socrates: Then, do you want to see shameful things, blind and crooked, although it being possible to hear bright and beautiful things from the side of others?

Glaucon: By Zeus, Socrates, do not withdraw just as though being near an end. For it is for an aid to us, even if you go through in this way also about the good, just as you went through about justice and prudence and the other things.

Socrates: For companion, it is also much for an aid even to me; but however I will not be able, I will incur laughter after showing zeal but disgracing myself. But, blessed men, let us let alone for the time being the good itself, on the one hand, what it ever is— for to reach at the thing appearing, at any rate, to me now seems to me to be more than according to the effort being present. But I am willing to speak about the thing which seems to be born of the good and most similar to that thing, if it is also dear to you all, but if not, I am willing to let go.

Glaucon: But speak: for you will repay the narration of the father in another time.

Socrates: I would want for me to be able to give it back and provide for you all, but not to provide only the offsprings just as now. And in fact then, receive this offspring and the thing born of the good itself. However, beware in order that I may not deceive you all in some way, involuntary, by giving the speech of the offspring dishonestly.

Glaucon: We will beware in accordance with power; but only speak.

Socrates: By conceding, at any rate, and reminding you the things said before and the things already having been said very often at another time.

Glaucon: What sorts of things?

Socrates: We say and distinguish by our speech that there are many beautiful things and many good things and each group of things in this way.

Glaucon: We do.

Socrates: And with respect to beautiful itself, in fact, and good itself, and in this way concerning all things which we were placing as many things at that time, again in turn by placing according to one form of each thing, since being one, we call each thing “the thing which is.”

Glaucon: That’s true.

Socrates: And in fact we say that some things, on the one hand, are seen but not perceived by mind, the forms, on the other hand, in turn, are perceived by mind, on the one hand, not seen, on the other hand.

Glaucon: Certainly in every way.

Socrates: Then, by means of what of we ourselves do we see the things being seen?

Glaucon: By means of our sight.

Socrates: Accordingly, we hear the things being heard also by means of hearing, and all the perceptible things by means of the other perceptions?

Glaucon: Of course.

Socrates: Then, have you considered the skilled workman of the perceptions, by how much he fabricated the power of seeing and being seeing as the most extravagant?

Glaucon: No quite.

Socrates: But consider in this way. Is it possible that there is still a need of another kind for hearing and sound towards hearing the former, the latter being heard, which, if not at hand as a third thing, the former will not hear, the latter will not be heard?

Glaucon: There is a need of nothing.

Socrates: And as I think at any rate, nor for many other perceptions—in order that I may not say that for any perception— is there a need of anything. Or are you able to say something?

Glaucon: I am not, at any rate.

Socrates: And don’t you think that the perception of the sight and the visible stands in need?

Glaucon: How?

Socrates: I suppose, although sight being in eyes and the man having it attempting to use it, and although color being present in things, unless a third kind is present, being by nature for this thing itself in a private way, you now that the sight sees nothing, and the matters are invisible.

Glaucon: In fact, of which of this thing do you speak?

Socrates: The thing which, in fact, you call light.

Glaucon: You say true things.

Socrates: Then, the perception of seeing and the power of being seen joined together not in a small form but a yoke more prized than the other yokes of things being yoked together, if indeed the light is not dishonored.

Glaucon: But indeed, it lacks much, at any rate, to be dishonored

Socrates: Then, whom of the gods in heaven can you allege as a lord of this thing, of whom the light makes sight for us to see as beautifully as possible and makes the things being seen to be seen?

Glaucon: The very man whom both you and the others allege as the cause; for it is clear that you are asking about the sun.

Socrates: Then, is sight in this way by nature in relation to this god?

Glaucon: How?

Socrates: Sun is neither the sight itself nor this thing in which it engenders, which in fact we call eye.

Glaucon: For no indeed.

Socrates: But I think that an eye is most sunlike, at any rate, of the organs concerning the perceptions.

Glaucon: By much, at any rate.

Socrates: Accordingly, has it acquired also the power which it holds, since being dispersed from this sun, just as something infused from the sun?

Glaucon: Certainly.

Socrates: Then, isn’t the sun also not sight, on the one hand, since being a cause, on the other hand, of it, it is seen by this thing itself?

Glaucon: In this way.

Socrates: Accordingly, say that I say that this is the offspring of the good, which the good begot as proportionate to itself, and that, with respect to the latter, whichever is itself in the intelligible realm in relation to mind and the things being thought, the former is in the visible realm in relation to sight and the things being seen.

Glaucon: How? Still go through for me.

Socrates: You know that eyes, when someone no longer turns them towards those things of whichever the light of day offers the colors, but things of which light by night offers the colors, they have a weak sight and seem to be near blind, just as clear sight not being present?

Glaucon: And very much so.

Socrates: But at any rate, as I think, when they clearly see the things which the sun shines upon, sight manifestly is in these same eyes?

Glaucon: Of course.

Socrates: Accordingly, consider also the thing of the soul thus in this way: whenever, on the one hand, it focuses on this thing which truth and the thing being shines upon, it understood and recognized it and seems to have reason; whenever, on the other hand, it focuses on the thing having been mingled with darkness, that is, the thing coming to be and the thing perishing, it holds an opinion and has weak sight, since changing the opinions up and down, and in turn is like a thing not having reason.

Glaucon: It seems so.

Socrates: Accordingly, say that the form of the good is this thing supplying the truth for the things being understood and giving the power to the man understanding, and since being a cause of knowledge and truth, think of it as a thing being understood, on the one hand, and although both things—knowledge and truth—being beautiful in this way, on the other hand, if believing that the good is different and still more beautiful then these, you will believe correctly; and knowledge and truth, just as thereupon it is correct to think that light and sight are like the sun, on the one hand, it is not correct to believe that they are sun, on the other hand, also in this way here, it is correct to think that both these things are like good, on the one hand, not correct to believe that either of them are the good, on the other hand, but still there must be an honoring the state of the good more greatly.

Glaucon: You say an extraordinary beauty, if it supplies knowledge, on the one hand, and truth, itself, on the other hand, is above these things in beauty; for, I suppose, you at any rate do not say that it is pleasure.

Socrates: Use words of good omen; but still examine more the likeness of it in this way.

Glaucon: How?

Socrates: As I think, you will say that the sun not only supplies the power of being seen for the things being seen, but also the generation and growth and nurture, although itself not being generation.

Glaucon: I will.

Socrates: And accordingly, say that under the good, not only is being understood present for the things being understood, but also that being and the essence is added to them from that thing, although the good not being essence, but still surpassing beyond the essence in rank and power.

Glaucon: By Apollo, what a marvelous hyperbole!

Socrates: For you are a cause, since forcing to say the things appearing to me about it.

Glaucon: But cease in no way, at any rate, if not anything, but by recounting again the similarity concerning the sun, if you leave behind in any way.

Socrates: But indeed, I leave behind many things, at any rate.

Glaucon: Do not even omit a small thing, accordingly.

Socrates: I think, on the one hand, even much; nevertheless, on the other hand, I will not purposely leave out so many things as many as, at any rate, is possible in the present.

Glaucon: Please don’t.

Note: The Greek text below is from:

Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.

Credits to the Perseus Digital Library for digitalizing the work.

[504e7] οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοῇ [505a] ἐμοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον: ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ᾗ δὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τἆλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ εἰ κεκτῄμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. [505b] ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθήν; ἢ πάντα τἆλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν;

μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις.

πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι.

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως.

[505c] πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅτι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

τί δὲ οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι; μῶν μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεῳ τῶν ἑτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς;

σφόδρα γε.

συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς οἶμαι ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἦ γάρ;

[505d] τί μήν;

οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν;

πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν εἰ μὴ εἴη, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα [505e] πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τἆλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ [506a] τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν;

ἥκιστά γ᾽, ἔφη.

οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα: μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.

καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύῃ.

οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ [506b] τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῂς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα;

οὗτος, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανὴς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν.

οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον [506c] χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον.

τί δέ; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδεν λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα;

οὐδαμῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ᾽ ἃ οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν.

τί δέ; εἶπον: οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί—ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες;

οὐδέν, ἔφη.

βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν [506d] παρ᾽ ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;

μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὢν ἀποστῇς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς.

καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει: ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ μακάριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ᾽ [506e] ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι—πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν—ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν.

ἀλλ᾽, ἔφη, λέγε: εἰς αὖθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτείσεις τὴν διήγησιν.

[507a] βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι μή πῃ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου.

εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν: ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε.

διομολογησάμενός γ᾽ ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τά τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα.

[507b] τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.

φαμὲν γάρ.

καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ᾽ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες, ‘ὃ ἔστιν’ ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν.

ἔστι ταῦτα.

καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαί φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὔ, τὰς δ᾽ αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ᾽ οὔ.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[507c] τῷ οὖν ὁρῶμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὁρώμενα;

τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά;

τί μήν;

ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν;

οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.

ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὅτι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκούεσθαι, ὃ [507d] ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται;

οὐδενός, ἔφη.

οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται;

πῶς;

ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ [507e] παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται, τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.

τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου;

ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φῶς.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι [508a] δύναμις τῶν ἄλλων συζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.

τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι;

ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι: τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν;

πῶς;

οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ [508b] δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἀλλ᾽ ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων.

πολύ γε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει ἐκ τούτου ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ᾽ ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ταύτης;

οὕτως, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸ [508c] ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.

πῶς; ἔφη: ἔτι δίελθέ μοι.

ὀφθαλμοί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

[508d] ὅταν δέ γ᾽ οἶμαι ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται.

τί μήν;

οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει: ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται: ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.

ἔοικε γάρ.

[508e] τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι: αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσῃ: ἐπιστήμην [509a] δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δ᾽ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ᾽ ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν.

ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν: οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις.

εὐφήμει, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει.

[509b] πῶς;

τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.

πῶς γάρ;

καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

[509c] καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.

σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν.

καὶ μηδαμῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών, εἴ πῃ ἀπολείπεις.

ἀλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω.

μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπῃς.

οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ πολύ: ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἑκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω.

μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.