Note for translation: inspired by C. D. C. Reeve, I reworked Socrates’ reported speech into direct conversation between him and Glaucon.

Socrates: Accordingly for my part, we seem to me to be able to show that, if one thing undergoing a change, it would change for the better, however not a small thing at any rate nor easy, but possible.

Glaucon: What?

Socrates: In fact, I am near it which we were comparing to the greatest wave. But it will be said then, even if someone, by laughing aloud, is about to artlessly deluge me by means of laughter and contempt, just like a wave. And consider the thing which I am about to say.

Glaucon: Speak.

Socrates: Unless either the philosophers rule in the cities or the men being now called as kings and rulers love knowledge genuinely and sufficiently, and this thing— both political power and philosophy— comes together into the same thing, and the many natures of the men now going separately to each are shut out by necessity, the cities do not have a rest from evils, dear Glaucon, and as I think, nor the human race, nor ever sooner will that very civil polity which we have now went through by speech grow into its capability and see light of sun. But this thing is the thing which long ago puts hesitation to me to speak, since seeing that it will be said much beyond belief: for it is difficult to see that no some other polity would be prosperous neither in a private way nor in a public way.

Glaucon: And, Socrates, you who have let fall that sort of saying and speech, having said which, you believe that very many and not insignificant men, just as after throwing their clothes, naked, taking a tool whichever happened to be near each man, having arranged themselves allegedly about to perform marvellous things, run toward you now in this way; whom if you will not defend yourself against by means of your speech and flight, you will truly pay a penalty after being mocked.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that you are a cause of these things for me?

Glaucon: Since I faring well, at any rate. But, let me tell you, I will not abandon you, but I will aid the things which I am able to aid. And I am able to aid good will and encouragement, and perhaps I would answer some other thing more rightly to you. But, since having that sort of aid, attempt to show to the ones disbelieving that it holds in the way which you say.

Socrates: There must be an attempting, since even you supply great alliance in this way. Then, if we are about to escape the ones whom you say in some way, it seems to me to be necessary to determine for them the philosophers— who, when speaking, we dare to say that it is necessary for them to rule, in order that, after the things becoming distinguishable, someone is able to defend himself, by showing that it is fitting by nature for some men to both engage in philosophies and lead the way in the city, for some other men not to engage but to obey the one leading.

Glaucon: It would be time to distinguish.

Socrates: Come on, follow me in this way, if we sufficiently explain it somehow or other.

Glaucon: Lead on.

Socrates: Then, will it be necessary to remind you, or have you remembered that if it is said correctly, whoever we say loves something, it is necessary for him to manifestly love not a part of that thing, another part not, but to love the whole thing?

Glaucon: It is necessary to remind me, as it seems; for I do not quite understand.

Socrates: Glaucon. it was fitting for another man to say the things which you say; but it is not fitting for an amorous man to be unmindful that all the men in the bloom of youth somehow or other bite and stir the man loving boys and amorous, since appearing to be worthy of attention and friendly welcome. Or do you all not do in this way for the beautiful ones? One man, whoever is snub-nosed, will be applauded by you all after called charming; you all say that the hooked-nose of another is royal, that another through the middle of these men, in fact, is most proportional, and that dark ones look manly, and light ones are children of gods; and with respect to honey-colored ones, do you think that even the name is an invention of something other than a beloved name, since called by a soft name and easily carrying the pallor, if it is with the bloom of youth? And by one speech, you all allege every excuse and send forth every phrase, so as to throw off no one of the blooming ones in the bloom of youth.

Glaucon: If you want to speak in the cause of me about the amorous men that they do in this way, I assent for the sake of the argument.

Socrates: But why? Don’t you see that the men fond of wine do these same things? Since following eagerly every wine upon every excuse?

Glaucon: And very much so.

Socrates: And further, as I think, you observe the men loving honor that, if they are not able to be a general, they are lieutenants, and if they are not able to be honored by greater and more revered men, they are well content if being honored by smaller and more insignificant men, since entirely being ones who long for honor.

Glaucon: Exactly.

Socrates: In fact, say this thing or not: the man whoever we say is desiring something, will we say that he desires all the form of this thing, or a part, another part not?

Glaucon: Everything.

Socrates: Accordingly, we will also say that the philosopher is desired of wisdom, not one part, another part not, but everything?

Glaucon: True.

Socrates: Then we will not say that the man feeling dislike concerning the learnings is fond of learning nor a philosopher, especially if being young and not yet having reason with respect to something serviceable and not, just as we say that the man unfriendly about the grains is neither hungry nor desired of foods, that nor is he fond of food but having a poor appetite.

Glaucon: And we will say correctly, at any rate.

Socrates: But in fact, the man easily being willing to taste every knowledge and gladly going towards learning and being insatiate, and this man we will justly say that is a philosopher. Isn’t it so?

Glaucon: Then many strange men will be those sorts of men in the eyes of you. For all the men fond of seeing seem to me at least to be those sorts, since rejoicing because of observing well, and the men fond of hearing conversation are some strangest men to place among philosophers in this way, at any rate, who would not be willing to come readily toward speeches on the one hand and that sort of serious occupation, just as, on the other hand, after having let out for hire their ears to hear every chorus, they run around festivals of Dionysus while being absent from neither the things related to cities nor the things related to villages. Then, will we say that all these men and others disposed to learn some things of the sort and the men of the small arts are philosophers?

Socrates: In no way, but similar, on the one hand, to philosophers.

Glaucon: Who do you say that the true ones, on the other hand, are?

Socrates: The ones fond of contemplating the truth.

Glaucon: And this thing correctly, for my part at any rate. But how do you mean it?

Socrates: In no way do I easily say to another man, at any rate; but I think that you will agree to me this sort of thing.

Glaucon: What sort of thing?

Socrates: That since the beautiful is opposite to the shameful, they are two things.

Glaucon: And how not?

Socrates: Accordingly, since they are two things, each is also one thing?

Glaucon: Also this.

Socrates: In fact, the same argument holds both concerning the just and unjust and good and bad and concerning all the forms, namely that, each thing is itself, on the one hand, one; because of its association, on the other hand, of the actions and bodies and each other, each thing appears as many things, since becoming visible everywhere.

Glaucon: You speak correctly.

Socrates: Accordingly, I distinguish in this way: separately on the one hand the men whom we were just now saying that are fond of seeing and fond of art and fit for action, and separately in turn the men about whom my argument is, whom alone someone would correctly address as philosophers.

Glaucon: How do you mean?

Socrates: I suppose, the men fond of hearing conversation and fond of seeing, on the one hand, welcome the beautiful sounds and colors and shapes and all the things being fabricated from those sorts; the thought of them is unable to see and welcome the nature of the beautiful itself, on the other hand.

Glaucon: For then of course it holds in this way.

Socrates: But in fact, wouldn’t the ones able to come toward the beautiful itself and to see it by itself be rare?

Glaucon: And very much so.

Socrates: Then, the man believing in beautiful things, on the one hand, if neither believing in beauty itself, on the other hand, nor if being able to follow if someone leads to the knowledge of it, does he appear to you to live in a dream or awake? And consider. Isn’t dreaming this thing— both if in sleep and if having awakened, someone does not believe that the thing similar to something is similar but that it is the very thing which it is like?

Glaucon: At least then I would say that the man of that sort is dreaming.

Socrates: But why? In an opposite way than these things, the man believing in some beautiful thing itself and being able to observe both it and the things sharing in that thing, and the man believing that neither the things sharing are it nor is it the things sharing, does this man appear to you to live awake or in turn also in a dream?

Glaucon: And very much awake.

Socrates: Accordingly, would we correctly say that the thought of the latter, since knowing, is knowledge, that the thought of the former, since holding an opinion, is an opinion?

Glaucon: Certainly.

Socrates: Then what about if that man, who we say holds an opinion but does not know, is angry with us and argues that we are not saying true things? Will we be able to somehow console him and persuade gently, although disguising that he is not sound of mind?

Glaucon: In fact it is necessary, at any rate, let me tell you.

Socrates: Come on, consider what we will say to him. Or you want that we may inquire from the side of him in this way, by saying that if he knows something, no one is envious to him, but we, well-pleased, would see that he knows something. But say this thing to us: does the one knowing knows something or nothing? You then answer me on behalf of that man.

Glaucon: I answer that he knows something.

Socrates: A thing existing or not existing?

Glaucon: Existing; for how would something be known if not existing?

Socrates: Then we hold this thing sufficiently, even if we should examine from many points of view, namely that, the thing altogether existing, on the one hand, is altogether known; the thing not existing in any way, on the other hand, is unknown in every way?

Glaucon: Most sufficiently.

Socrates: Quite so; and in fact, if in this way something is thus able to exist and not exist, wouldn’t it be placed between the thing purely existing and the thing in no way existing?

Glaucon: Yes, between.

Socrates: Accordingly, since knowledge was for the thing existing, on the one hand, ignorance, on the other hand, by necessity for the thing not existing, there must also be a seeking something between ignorance and knowledge for that thing in between, if something happens to be that sort?

Glaucon: Certainly.

Socrates: Then do we say that opinion is something?

Glaucon: For how not?

Socrates: That it is a power different from knowledge or the same?

Glaucon: Different.

Socrates: Then, opinion has been arranged for one thing and knowledge for another, according to each power of itself.

Glaucon: In this way.

Socrates: Accordingly, is knowledge, on the one hand, by nature for the thing existing— to know how the thing existing exists? But it seems to me to be more necessary to distinguish this thing earlier.

Glaucon: How?

Socrates: We will say that powers are some kind of the things being, by means of which, in fact, we also are able to do the things which we are able and every other thing whatever is able to be done. For example, I say that sight and hearing are of the powers, if then you know the form which I want to say.

Glaucon: But I know.

Socrates: In fact, hear the thing which seems to me about them. For I neither see some color of a power nor shape nor something of those sorts, the sort which is also of many other things, after paying attention to which, I determine by myself that sometimes some things are one group, others another. But of a power, I look toward that thing alone for which it exists and which it accomplishes, and in this way I called each of them a power, and I call the one having been arranged for the same thing, on the one hand, and the one causing the same thing the same power, the one having been arranged for a different thing and causing a different thing, on the other hand, a different power. And what about you? How do you do?

Glaucon: In this way.

Socrates: Again hither, in fact, very good fellow. Do you say that knowledge is itself some power, or into what kind do you put it?

Glaucon: Into this, the most powerful of all powers, at any rate.

Socrates: But why? Will we bring opinion into power or into another form?

Glaucon: In no way; for the thing by means of which we are able to hold an opinion is not anything other than opinion.

Socrates: But indeed, you were agreeing slightly earlier that knowledge and opinion is not the same thing.

Glaucon: For how would someone, if having sense, put the blameless thing, at any rate, as the same thing to the not blameless thing?

Socrates: Beautifully, and it is clear that opinion is agreed to us to be different from knowledge.

Glaucon: Yes, it is different.

Socrates: Then, each of them, since being able to do something different, is by nature for a different thing?

Glaucon: Necessarily.

Socrates: Is knowledge on the one hand at any rate, I suppose, for the thing existing— to know the thing existing how it holds?

Glaucon: Yes.

Socrates: Opinion, on the other hand, as we say, is to opinionize?

Glaucon: Yes.

Socrates: Does it opinionize the very same thing which knowledge knows? And is an object of knowledge and an object of opinion the same thing? Or is it impossible?

Glaucon: It is impossible from the things having been agreed. If indeed one power is by nature for one thing, another for another thing, and both— opinion and knowledge— are powers, and each is different, as we say, from these things of course it is not possible for a matter of knowledge and a matter of opinion to be the same thing.

Socrates: Accordingly, if the thing existing is known, would a matter of opinion be something other than the thing existing?

Glaucon: It would be something other.

Socrates: Then does one form an opinion about the thing not existing? Or is it impossible to even have an opinion about the thing not existing, at any rate? And consider. Doesn’t the man holding an opinion brings his opinion toward something? Or it is possible in turn to form an opinion on the one hand, to form an opinion on the other hand about nothing?

Glaucon: It is impossible.

Socrates: But does the man forming an opinion form an opinion about some one thing, at any rate?

Glaucon: Yes.

Socrates: But indeed the thing not existing, at any rate, would be most correctly addressed not as some one thing, but nothing?

Glaucon: Certainly.

Socrates: We were conceding that ignorance by necessity is truly for the thing not existing, but that knowledge is for the thing existing?

Glaucon: Correctly.

Socrates: Then the thing existing does not form an opinion, nor does the thing not existing?

Glaucon: No indeed.

Socrates: Then opinion would be neither ignorance nor knowledge?

Glaucon: It seems not.

Socrates: Then is opinion beyond these things, since surpassing either knowledge with respect to clearness or ignorance with respect to obscurity?

Glaucon: Neither of two.

Socrates: But opinion seems to you to be more obscure than knowledge, on the one hand, clearer than ignorance, on the other hand?

Glaucon: And by far, at any rate.

Socrates: And it is placed within both things?

Glaucon: Yes.

Socrates: Then opinion would be between these two things.

Glaucon: Just so.

Socrates: Accordingly, we were previously saying that, if something is that sort of thing which at the same time is the thing existing and not existing, that sort of thing is placed between purely existing and entirely not existing, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance will be for it, but the thing appearing, in turn, between ignorance and knowledge?

Glaucon: Correctly.

Socrates: And now, at any rate, has the thing, in fact, which we call opinion seemed to be between these two things?

Glaucon: It has.

Socrates: In fact, that thing would be left to us to discover, as it seems, namely, the thing sharing in both things— existing and not existing— and neither of two would be correctly addressed as pure, in order that, if it appears, we may truly address that it is a matter of opinion, by assigning the extreme things to the extreme things, on the one hand, the things in between to the things in between, on the other hand. Or not in this way?

Glaucon: In this way.

Socrates: In fact, since these things being established, let him speak to me, as I will say, and let him answer— the good man who believes that the beautiful itself, on the one hand, and some form of beauty itself is nothing, always being in like matter according to the same things, who thinks that the beautiful things are many, on the other hand— that man fond of seeing and suffering in no way if someone says that the beautiful is one, and the just and the other things in this way. “My very good fellow,” as we will say, “for in fact, of these many beautiful things, surely there is not something that will not seem to be shameful? And of the just things, something that does not seem to be unjust? And of the pious things, something that does not seem to be impious?”

Glaucon: There is not, but there is a necessity, I suppose, for them to seem to be both beautiful and shameful, and so many other things which you ask.

Socrates: And what about the many double things? Do they appear as halves somehow less than as doubles?

Glaucon: Not at all.

Socrates: And in fact, will these things whichever we say that are big and small and light and heavy be addressed not somehow more than their opposites?

Glaucon: They will not, but each thing will always cling to both qualities.

Socrates: Then, is each of the many things this thing whichever some says that it is more than it is not?

Glaucon: It is like the ambiguous things in the feastings and the riddle of the children about the eunuch, about the stroke of a bat— the riddle to which and upon which they speak in riddles that he hits it; for even these things seem to be ambiguous, and it is possible to firmly consider that any of them neither is nor is not, is neither both nor neither of two.

Socrates: Then, do you have how you will use them, or to where you will put a better position of the thing between essence and not existing? For I suppose, they will seem to be neither more obscure than the thing not existing in relation to not existing more, nor clearer than the thing existing in relation to existing more.

Glaucon: Most truly.

Socrates: Then we have discovered, as it seems, that the many sayings of the many men both concerning beauty and the other things are tossed between, I suppose, the thing not existing and the thing purely existing.

Glaucon: We have discovered.

Socrates: And at any rate, we granted before that if something seems to be that sort of thing, it is necessary for it to be said as an object of opinion but not an object of knowledge, since the thing wandering in between being taken by means of a power in between.

Glaucon: We have agreed.

Socrates: Then, the men seeing many beautiful things, but if not seeing the beautiful itself not being able to follow another man leading towards it, and the men seeing many just things, but if not seeing the just itself, and all the things in this way, we will say that they form an opinion about quite all things, but knows nothing of the things which they form an opinion about.

Glaucon: Necessarily.

Socrates: In turn, what about the men seeing each things themselves individually and the things always being in like manner according to the same things? Won’t we say that they knows but do not hold an opinion?

Glaucon: Necessarily also these.

Socrates: Accordingly, will we also say that the latter welcome and love these things for which knowledge is, the former the things for which opinion is? Or do we not remember that we were saying that these ones love and see beautiful sounds and colors and those sorts of things, but not even bear the fact that the beautiful itself is something existing?

Glaucon: We remember.

Socrates: Then, won’t we somehow offend, if calling them lovers of opinion more than philosophers? And will they very much be angry with us if we speak in this way?

Glaucon: No, if at any rate they obey me; for it is not a custom to be angry with the truth.

Socrates: Then there must be a calling the men welcoming each existing thing itself as philosophers but not lovers of opinion?

Glaucon: Certainly in every way.

Note: The Greek text below is from:

Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.

Credits to the Perseus Digital Library for digitalizing the work.

[473c2] ἑνὸς μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμέν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέσοι ἄν, οὐ μέντοι σμικροῦ γε οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου, δυνατοῦ δέ.

τίνος; ἔφη.

ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰμὶ ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσῃκάζομεν κύματι. εἰρήσεται δ᾽ οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ κατακλύσειν. σκόπει δὲ ὃ μέλλω λέγειν.

λέγε, ἔφη.

ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν [473d]ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ᾽ [473e] οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία μή ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἣν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι ὄκνον ἐντίθησι λέγειν, ὁρῶντι ὡς πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται: χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλη τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ.

καὶ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον ἐκβέβληκας ῥῆμά τε καὶ λόγον, ὃν εἰπὼν ἡγοῦ ἐπὶ σὲ πάνυ πολλούς τε καὶ [474a] οὐ φαύλους νῦν οὕτως, οἷον ῥίψαντας τὰ ἱμάτια, γυμνοὺς λαβόντας ὅτι ἑκάστῳ παρέτυχεν ὅπλον, θεῖν διατεταμένους ὡς θαυμάσια ἐργασομένους: οὓς εἰ μὴ ἀμυνῇ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐκφεύξῃ, τῷ ὄντι τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην.

οὐκοῦν σύ μοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τούτων αἴτιος;

καλῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, ἐγὼ ποιῶν. ἀλλά τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμυνῶ οἷς δύναμαι: δύναμαι δὲ εὐνοίᾳ τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι [474b] ἀποκρινοίμην. ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔχων τοιοῦτον βοηθὸν πειρῶ τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ᾗ σὺ λέγεις.

πειρατέον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ οὕτω μεγάλην συμμαχίαν παρέχῃ. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μέλλομέν πῃ ἐκφεύξεσθαι οὓς λέγεις, διορίσασθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας λέγοντες τολμῶμεν φάναι δεῖν ἄρχειν, ἵνα διαδήλων γενομένων δύνηταί τις ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐνδεικνύμενος [474c] ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει ἅπτεσθαί τε φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονεύειν τ᾽ ἐν πόλει, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις μήτε ἅπτεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ ἡγουμένῳ.

ὥρα ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ὁρίζεσθαι.

ἴθι δή, ἀκολούθησόν μοι τῇδε, ἐὰν αὐτὸ ἁμῇ γέ πῃ ἱκανῶς ἐξηγησώμεθα.

ἄγε, ἔφη.

ἀναμιμνῄσκειν οὖν σε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δεήσει, ἢ μέμνησαι ὅτι ὃν ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς λέγηται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα;

[474d] ἀναμιμνῄσκειν, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικεν, δεῖ: οὐ γὰρ πάνυ γε ἐννοῶ.

ἄλλῳ, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἃ λέγεις: ἀνδρὶ δ᾽ ἐρωτικῷ οὐ πρέπει ἀμνημονεῖν ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν ὥρᾳ τὸν φιλόπαιδα καὶ ἐρωτικὸν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ δάκνουσί τε καὶ κινοῦσι, δοκοῦντες ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀσπάζεσθαι. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλούς; ὁ μέν, ὅτι σιμός, ἐπίχαρις κληθεὶς ἐπαινεθήσεται ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν φατε εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δὴ διὰ [474e] μέσου τούτων ἐμμετρώτατα ἔχειν, μέλανας δὲ ἀνδρικοὺς ἰδεῖν, λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας εἶναι: μελιχλώρους δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα οἴει τινὸς ἄλλου ποίημα εἶναι ἢ ἐραστοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου τε καὶ εὐχερῶς φέροντος τὴν ὠχρότητα, ἐὰν ἐπὶ ὥρᾳ ᾖ; καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζεσθέ τε [475a] καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδένα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούντων ἐν ὥρᾳ.

εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσι, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν.

τί δέ; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: τοὺς φιλοίνους οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦντας ὁρᾷς; πάντα οἶνον ἐπὶ πάσης προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους;

καὶ μάλα.

καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, καθορᾷς ὅτι, ἂν μὴ στρατηγῆσαι δύνωνται, τριττυαρχοῦσιν, κἂν μὴ ὑπὸ μειζόνων [475b] καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς ὅλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταὶ ὄντες.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

τοῦτο δὴ φάθι ἢ μή: ἆρα ὃν ἄν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μέν, τοῦ δὲ οὔ;

παντός, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάσης;

ἀληθῆ.

τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἄλλως τε [475c] καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μήπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστὸν καὶ μή, οὐ φήσομεν φιλομαθῆ οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερῆ οὔτε πεινῆν φαμεν οὔτ᾽ ἐπιθυμεῖν σιτίων, οὐδὲ φιλόσιτον ἀλλὰ κακόσιτον εἶναι.

καὶ ὀρθῶς γε φήσομεν.

τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι καὶ ἁσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἰόντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δ᾽ ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν φιλόσοφον: ἦ γάρ;

[475d] καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη: πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι ἔσονταί σοι τοιοῦτοι. οἵ τε γὰρ φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, οἵ τε φιλήκοοι ἀτοπώτατοί τινές εἰσιν ὥς γ᾽ ἐν φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι, οἳ πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἑκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὦτα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι. τούτους οὖν πάντας καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων τινῶν [475e] μαθητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνυδρίων φιλοσόφους φήσομεν;

οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις.

τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις;

τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας.

καὶ τοῦτο μέν γ᾽, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς: ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις;

οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ῥᾳδίως πρός γε ἄλλον: σὲ δὲ οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν μοι τὸ τοιόνδε.

τὸ ποῖον;

ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχρῷ, δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι.

[476a] πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον;

καὶ τοῦτο.

καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον.

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

ταύτῃ τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, διαιρῶ, χωρὶς μὲν οὓς νυνδὴ ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς, [476b] καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὓς μόνους ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους.

πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

οἱ μέν που, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι.

ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ἔφη, οὕτως.

οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ ὁρᾶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἆρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν;

[476c] καὶ μάλα.

ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἄν τις ἡγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἕπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; σκόπει δέ. τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἆρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντ᾽ ἐγρηγορὼς τὸ ὅμοιόν τῳ μὴ ὅμοιον ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν;

ἐγὼ γοῦν ἄν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, φαίην ὀνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

τί δέ; ὁ τἀναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν [476d] καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;

καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὕπαρ.

οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τί οὖν ἐὰν ἡμῖν χαλεπαίνῃ οὗτος, ὅν φαμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γιγνώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῇ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν; [476e] ἕξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν ἠρέμα, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει;

δεῖ γέ τοι δή, ἔφη.

ἴθι δή, σκόπει τί ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν. ἢ βούλει ὧδε πυνθανώμεθα παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ, λέγοντες ὡς εἴ τι οἶδεν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ἅσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι. ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τόδε: ὁ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τὶ ἢ οὐδέν; σὺ οὖν μοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίνου.

ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὅτι γιγνώσκει τί.

πότερον ὂν ἢ οὐκ ὄν;

[477a] ὄν: πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη;

ἱκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὂν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον;

ἱκανώτατα.

εἶεν: εἰ δὲ δή τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῇ ὄντος;

μεταξύ.

οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον [477b] ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτον;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι;

πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτήν;

ἄλλην.

ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὑτῆς.

οὕτω.

οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γνῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν; —μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδέ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελέσθαι.

πῶς;

[477c] φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτι περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.

ἀλλὰ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

ἄκουσον δὴ ὅ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν. δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οἷον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἀποβλέπων ἔνια διορίζομαι παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα: δυνάμεως [477d] δ᾽ εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἑκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιεῖς;

οὕτως, ἔφη.

δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε. ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν τινα φῂς εἶναι αὐτήν, ἢ εἰς τί γένος τιθεῖς;

[477e] τί δέ, δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἴσομεν;

οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη: ᾧ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἐστίν.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὀλίγον γε πρότερον ὡμολόγεις μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν.

πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, τό γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταὐτόν τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη;

καλῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα [478a] ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν.

ἕτερον.

ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν;

ἀνάγκη.

ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὂν γνῶναι ὡς ἔχει;

ναί.

δόξα δέ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν;

ναί.

ἦ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γιγνώσκει; καὶ ἔσται γνωστόν τε καὶ δοξαστὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἀδύνατον;

ἀδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων: εἴπερ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἄλλη δύναμις πέφυκεν, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφότεραί ἐστον, δόξα τε [478b] καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλη δὲ ἑκατέρα, ὥς φαμεν, ἐκ τούτων δὴ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γνωστὸν καὶ δοξαστὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι.

οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὂν γνωστόν, ἄλλο τι ἂν δοξαστὸν ἢ τὸ ὂν εἴη;

ἄλλο.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἐννόει δέ. οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν; ἢ οἷόν τε αὖ δοξάζειν μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν;

ἀδύνατον.

ἀλλ᾽ ἕν γέ τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων;

ναί.

ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ᾽ ἂν [478c] προσαγορεύοιτο;

πάνυ γε.

μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν;

ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

οὐκ ἄρα ὂν οὐδὲ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει;

οὐ γάρ.

οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα ἂν εἴη;

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ἄρ᾽ οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, ὑπερβαίνουσα ἢ γνῶσιν σαφηνείᾳ ἢ ἄγνοιαν ἀσαφείᾳ;

οὐδέτερα.

ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, γνώσεως μέν σοι φαίνεται δόξα σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον;

καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη.

[478d] ἐντὸς δ᾽ ἀμφοῖν κεῖται;

ναί.

μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἴη τούτοιν δόξα.

κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανείη οἷον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κεῖσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὖ φανὲν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης;

ὀρθῶς.

νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτοιν ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν;

πέφανται.

[478e] ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείποιτ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν εὑρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν δίκῃ προσαγορεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

οὕτω.

τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω [479a] ὁ χρηστὸς ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἄν τις ἓν τὸ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω. ‘τούτων γὰρ δή, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον;’

[479b] οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά πως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φανῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐρωτᾷς.

τί δὲ τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια; ἧττόν τι ἡμίσεα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται;

οὐδέν.

καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τἀναντία;

οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεί, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται.

πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τοῦτο ὃ ἄν τις φῇ αὐτὸ εἶναι;

τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικεν, [479c] καὶ τῷ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου, τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οὗ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὔτ᾽ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον.

ἔχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι χρήσῃ, ἢ ὅποι θήσεις καλλίω θέσιν τῆς μεταξὺ οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι; οὔτε γάρ που σκοτωδέστερα μὴ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον μὴ εἶναι [479d] φανήσεται, οὔτε φανότερα ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

ηὑρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς.

ηὑρήκαμεν.

προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γνωστὸν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ μεταξὺ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξὺ πλανητὸν ἁλισκόμενον.

ὡμολογήκαμεν.

[479e] τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὁρῶντας μηδ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἕπεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον μή, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γιγνώσκειν δὲ ὧν δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν.

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα; ἆρ᾽ οὐ γιγνώσκειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δοξάζειν;

ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαί τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα [480a] φήσομεν ἐφ᾽ οἷς γνῶσίς ἐστιν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ᾽ οἷς δόξα; ἢ οὐ μνημονεύομεν ὅτι φωνάς τε καὶ χρόας καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀνέχεσθαι ὥς τι ὄν;

μεμνήμεθα.

μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλοδόξους καλοῦντες αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφους; καὶ ἆρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν ἂν οὕτω λέγωμεν;

οὔκ, ἄν γέ μοι πείθωνται, ἔφη: τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις.

τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὂν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον;

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.