Accordingly, after these things, he said, after I had given up examining the things being, it appeared to me to be necessary to be cautious lest I might suffer the very thing which the men observing and examining the sun, when being in eclipse, suffer. For, I suppose, some men are destroyed with respect to their eyes, if they do not examine the image of it in water or something of the sort. I also had in mind something of the sort, and I feared lest I might be blinded in every way with respect to my soul, since seeing towards the matters by means of my eyes and attempting to perceive them by means of each of my senses. In fact, it seemed to me to be necessary, by having recourse into the speeches, to examine in these the reality of the things being. However, perhaps it is not like the thing which I compare in some way: for I do not altogether assent that the man examining in speeches the things being examines more in images than the man examining in deeds. But then in fact, I started in this way at any rate, and after proposing on each occasion a speech whichever I judge to be most powerful, I place things whichever, on the one hand, appear to me to harmonize with this thing as things being true, both concerning cause and concerning quite all the others; whichever, on the other hand, do not, I place as things not true. And I want to speak more clearly to you the things which I say, for I think that you do not understand now.

No, by Zeus, Cebes said, not very much.

But, he said, I speak in this way, nothing new, but the very things which always at another time and in the speech having passed by I have not at all ceased from saying. For in fact, I come since attempting to show to you the form of the cause which I have busied myself, and I will go back to those much-spoken-of things and begin from these things, by proposing that there exists some Beautiful, itself by itself, and a Good and a Great and all the other things; which if you grant to me and concede that these things exist, I hope that from these things, I will show to you the cause and find out how the soul is an immortal thing.

But indeed, Cebes said, since granting to you, make haste in drawing a conclusion.

Consider then, he said, the things next after those things, if they seem good to you just as to me. For if there exists some other beautiful thing except the Beautiful itself, it seems to me to be beautiful not even on account of one other thing than for the reason that it shares in that Beautiful; and I speak all things, in fact, in this way. Do you assent to this sort of cause?

I agree, he said.

Accordingly, he said, I do not yet know nor able to recognize the other causes, these wise ones; but if someone says to me why a whatsoever thing is beautiful, either since having a bright color or shape or whatever other thing of those sorts of things, I let pass the others things, on the one hand, for I am disturbed in all the other things; this thing, on the other hand, I simple-mindedly and artlessly and perhaps foolishly hold in my own mind, namely, that no any other thing makes it beautiful than either the presence of that Beautiful or association or the thing in whatever sort of way and however is being addressed; for I do not yet affirm confidently this thing, but that all the beautiful things are beautiful because of the Beautiful. For this appears to me to be the safest both for myself and for another man to answer, and by clinging to this, I believe that I would not ever fall, but that it is safe both for me and for whoever another man to answer that the beautiful things become beautiful because of the Beautiful; or does it not also appear to you?

It does.

Also then, the big things are big and the bigger things bigger because of bigness, and the smaller things are smaller because of smallness?

Yes.

Nor then would you accept if someone should say that some one man is bigger than another by the head, and that the smaller man is shorter by that same thing, but you would protest that you says no other thing than that each every bigger thing is bigger than another because of nothing other than bigness, and on account of this it is bigger, namely, on account of its bigness, and that the smaller thing is smaller because of nothing other than smallness, and on account of this it is smaller, namely, on account of its smallness, since fearing, as I think, lest some opposite speech may come upon you, if you say that someone is bigger and smaller by the head, first on the one hand, that the bigger thing is bigger and the smaller thing smaller by the same thing, then that by the head, although being small, the bigger man is bigger, and that this thing, in fact, is a marvel— someone being big by something small; or would you not fear these things?

And Cebes, having laughed, said, I would, at any rate.

Accordingly, he said, you would be afraid to say that ten is greater than eight by two and that it exceeds on account of that cause, but not by multitude and on account of multitude? And that the two-cubit length is bigger than the one-cubit length by half but not by bigness? For I suppose it is the same fear.

Certainly, he said.

And what? Wouldn’t you be cautious to say that, when one added to one, the addition is a cause of two’s coming to be or, when divided, the division? And you would cry aloud that you know that each thing becomes big in no other way, I suppose, than by sharing in the particular reality of each thing in whichever it shares, and that in these things, you do not have some other cause of two’s coming to be except the participation of Twoness, and that it is necessary for the things being about to be two to share in this thing and for the thing whichever is about to be one to share in Oneness, and you would permit to dismiss these divisions and additions and those other refinements of the sort, since allowing for the men wiser than yourself to answer; but you, as the thing being said, since having feared your own shadow and your ignorance, by clinging to the safety of your hypothesis, would answer in this way. And if someone should attack the hypothesis itself, you would permit to dismiss and you would not answer until you examine the things having arisen from that hypothesis whether to you they harmonize or disagree with one another; and when it should be necessary for you to give a speech of that thing itself, you would give in like manner, by supposing again another hypothesis, whichever should seem best of the higher ones, until you come to something sufficient, and at the same time, you would not jumble your arguments just as the debaters, when conversing about the beginning and the things having arisen from that, if indeed you should want to discover something of the things being? For perhaps those men, on the one hand, have not even one speech or thought about this thing; for although throwing all things into confusion by a wisdom close at hand, they themselves nevertheless are sufficient to be able to please themselves; but if indeed you are one of the philosophers, as I think, you would do as I say.

You speak most truly, said Simmias, and Cebes at the same time.

Previously, Socrates narrated his experience with natural science and engagement with Anaxagoras, who posits that the Mind is the director and cause of everything. After explaining how both failed to provide true causes of generation, existence, and destruction, Plato’s Socrates provides his own method.

Note: The Greek text below is from:

Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.

Credits to the Perseus Digital Library for digitalizing the work.

ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν: διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἤ [99e] τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω [100a] τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν: οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὄντων, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω: οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν.

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

[100b] ἀλλ᾽, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ ἀεί τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα: ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή.

[100c] ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.

σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐάν σοι συνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ: καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς;

συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.

οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν: ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ [100d] δι᾽ ὅτι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, —ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι—τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος [100e] ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά: ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

δοκεῖ.

καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω;

ναί.

οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ᾽ ἂν ἀποδέχοιο εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ [101a] τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ [101b] τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι: ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα;

καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος.

πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.

τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι [101c] τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐῴης ἂν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις: [101d] σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, [101e] ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς: ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν: σὺ δ᾽, εἴπερ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ [102a] λέγω ποιοῖς.

ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.