Socrates: Welcome, Ion. From where have you been visiting us right now? Or from home, from Ephesos?

Ion: In no way, Socrates, but from Epidauros, from the Asklepieia.

Socrates: The Epidaurians do not hold a contest also of rhapsodes for the god, do they?

Ion: Certainly, and of the other art presided over by a muse.

Socrates: Why then? Were you contending for some prize for us? And how did you contend for a prize at all?

Ion: We won the first of the prizes, Socrates.

Socrates: You speak well; come on, see to it that we will win even the Panathenaia.

Ion: But these things will be, if god wishes.

Socrates: And indeed, I very often envied you rhapsodes, Ion, for your art: for at the same time, on the one hand, being always fitting for your art to have been adorned with respect to your body and for you to appear as beautiful as possible; at the same time, on the other hand, being necessary to spend time in other poets and many good ones, and especially most in Homer, the best and most divine of the poets, and to learn thoroughly the thought of him, not only his epics—it is enviable. For he would not ever become a good rhapsode if he should not understand the things being said by the poet. For it is necessary for the rhapsode to become an interpreter of the thought of the poet for the ones listening: and it is impossible to do this thing well if not knowing what the poet says. Therefore, all these are worthy to be envied.

Ion: You say true things, Socrates; for me, this thing at least then supplied most work of my art, and I think that I of men speak most beautifully concerning Homer, for neither Metrodoros of Lampsakos, nor Stesimbrotos of Thasos, nor Glaukon, nor any other of the ones ever yet being born was able to speak so many beautiful thoughts concerning Homer as many as I am able.

Socrates: You speak well, Ion; for it is clear that you will not grudge to display for me.

Ion: And indeed it is worthy to hear, Socrates, how well I have adorned Homer; with the result that I think that I am worthy to be crowned with a golden wreath by rhapsode descendants of Homer.

Socrates: And further I will still make leisure to listen to you, but now answer me just so much: are you only clever concerning Homer or also concerning Hesiod and Archilochos of Paros?

Ion: In no way, but only concerning Homer; for it seems to me to be sufficient.

Socrates: But is there about which Homer and Hesiod say the same things?

Ion: I think even many.

Socrates: Therefore, concerning these things, would you explain better the things which Homer says or the things which Hesiod says?

Ion: I would explain similarly concerning these things, Socrates, concerning which they say the same things.

Socrates: But what about the things concerning which they do not say the same things? For example, Homer says something about the art of prophesy, so do Hesiod.

Ion: Certainly.

Socrates: What then? As many things similarly and as many things differently concerning the art of prophesy as these two poets say, would you explain better or someone of the good prophets?

Ion: Of the prophets.

Socrates: And if you were a prophet, just if you were able to explain concerning the things being said similarly, would you not be knowing how to explain concerning the things being said differently?

Ion: It is clear that.

Socrates: Then why, at some time, are you clever concerning, on the one hand, Homer, not, concerning, on the other hand, Hesiod, and not the other poets? Or does Homer say about things other than the very things about which all together the other poets say? Has he not recounted for the most part about war and about intercourses of men good and bad and laymen and skilled workmen toward one another, and about gods having relations toward one another and toward human beings—how they have relations—and about the heavenly experiences, and about the things in the realm of Hades, and births both of gods and of heroes? Are these things not about which Homer has made his poetry?

Ion: You speak true things, Socrates.

Socrates: And what about the other poets? Not about the same things?

Ion: Yes, but, Socrates, they have not composed in the same way as Homer.

Socrates: Yet why? Worse?

Ion: By far.

Socrates: And Homer better?

Ion: Better, indeed, by Zeus.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that, dear head Ion, whenever, many men speaking concerning number, some one man speaks best, someone will certainly recognize the one speaking well?

Ion: I affirm.

Socrates: Therefore, is there the same man, the very one who also recognizes the ones speaking badly, or another?

Ion: The same man, I suppose.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that the one having the arithmetical art is that man?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: But why? Whenever, many men speaking concerning healthy foods what sorts they are, some one man speaks best, will some one man, on the one hand, recognize what the man speaking best speaks best, the other, on the other hand, recognize what the man speaking worse speaks worse, or will the same man recognize?

Ion: It is clear, I suppose, the same man.

Socrates: Who is he? What name does he have?

Ion: Doctor.

Socrates: Therefore, in sum, we say that the same man will always recognize, concerning the same things, when many men speaking, who speaks well and who badly; if he will not recognize the one speaking worse, it is clear that he will not even recognize the one speaking well, concerning, at any rate, the same thing.

Ion: That is so.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that the same man turns out clever concerning both?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that you say that both Homer and the other poets, in whom both Hesiod and Archilochos of Paros are, speak about the same things?

Ion: And I say true things.

Socrates: Therefore, just if you recognize the one speaking well, you would also recognize the ones speaking worse what they speak worse.

Ion: It seems likely.

Socrates: Therefore, best man, saying that Ion is similarly clever about Homer and about the other poets, we will not make a mistake, since he himself agrees that the same man will be a judge sufficient of all, however many speak about the same things, and that the poets almost quite all compose the same things.

Ion: Then what ever is the cause, Socrates, that I, whenever, on the one hand, someone converses about some other poet, I neither apply my mind and I am unable to contribute anything at all worthy of speech, but I simply doze; whenever, on the other hand, someone mentions about Homer, I am immediately awake, and I apply my mind, and I prosper what I am to say?

Socrates: It is not difficult to conjecture this thing, companion, but it is clear to all that you are unable to speak about Homer by means of art and knowledge; for if you were able with art, you would also be able to speak about quite all the other poets; for the poetic art, I suppose, is as a whole. Or not?

Ion: Yes

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that when someone takes also another art anything at all as a whole, there will be the same manner of the inquiry concerning quite all the arts? How am I to say this, what is it necessary to hear from me, Ion?

Ion: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I do; for I enjoy listening to you wise men.

Socrates: I would want you to speak true things, Ion; but wise, on the one hand, I suppose, are you rhapsodes and actors and men of whom the poems you sing of; I, on the other hand, speak merely the true things, such as is reasonable for a layman person to speak. And since concerning that thing which just now I asked you, contemplate how ordinary and amateurish and characteristic of every man it is to recognize the thing which I was saying, namely that it is the same inquiry, whenever someone takes an art as a whole. For let us take it by the word; for is painting some art as a whole?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that also many painters both are and have turned out to be good and ordinary?

Ion: Certainly.

Socrates: Now then, did you see someone who, concerning on the one hand Polygnotos the son of Aglaophon, is clever at showing forth the things which he paints well and the things which he does not, concerning on the other hand the other painters, he is unable? And who, whenever, on the one hand, someone displays the works of the other painters, he dozes and is at a loss and does not have what he is to contribute; whenever, on the other hand, concerning Polygnotos or another man, whoever you want, it is necessary to show forth an opinion of one man alone of the painters, he is awake, and he applies his mind, and he prospers what he is to speak?

Ion: No, by Zeus, of course not.

Socrates: But why? Now, in the art of sculpture, did you see someone who, concerning on the one hand Daidalos of Metion, or Epeios of Panopeus, or Theodoros of Samos, or some other sculptor, about one man is clever at explaining the things which he has made well; on the other hand, in the works of the other sculptors, he is at a loss and dozes, not having what he is to say?

Ion: No, by Zeus, I have not even seen that man.

Socrates: Nor further, as I think, in the art of pipe-playing and not in the art of playing the kithara and not in the art of singing and playing the kithara and not in recitation of epic poetry did you ever yet see a man whoever concerning, on the one hand, Homer is clever at explaining, or concerning Thamyras or concerning Orpheus or concerning Phemios the rhapsode of Ithaca; concerning, on the other hand, Ion the rhapsode of Ephesos, he is at a loss and is not able to contribute the things which he recites epic poems well and the things which he does not.

Ion: I am not able to speak against you concerning this, Socrates; but I know for myself that thing, namely that I of men speak most beautifully about homer, and I prosper, and all the others affirm that I speak well, but not concerning the others. And further, see this what it is.

Socrates: And I see, Ion, and I come to you to demonstrate it which seems to me to be to be this. For there exists that thing, not being an art on the one hand, at the side of you that is to speak well about Homer, that which I was just now saying, being a divine power, on the other hand, which sets you in motion, just as in the stone which Euripides, on the one hand, called Magnet, the many men, on the other hand, Herakleia. For in fact the stone itself not only leads the iron rings themselves but also puts power in the rings so as for it in turn to be able to do that same thing, the very thing which the stone does—to lead other rings, with the result that, at times, a very long string of iron rings has been fastened from one another. And by means of all these, the power has been fastened up from that stone. And also in this way the Muse, on the one hand, herself makes men possessed; on the other hand, through the possessed ones, a chain has been fastened from those others being inspired by a god. For all the good poets of the epics speak all these beautiful poems not from an art, but inspired and being possessed, and the good lyric poets likewise, just as the ones in a Korybantic frenzy dance, being not in their right mind, and in this way the lyric poets compose these beautiful lyric poems, not being in their right mind, but whenever they step into the harmony and into the rhythm, they are inspired and being possessed, just as the Bacchantes, being possessed, draw for themselves honey and milk from the rivers, but when being in their right mind, they do not do so, and the soul of the lyric poets does this thing, just which they themselves say. For the poets say toward us, I suppose, that culling from fountains flowing with honey, from some gardens and groves of Muses, they bring to us the lyric poems just as the bees, and they themselves thus flying, and they say true things. For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and they are not able to compose earlier until they become inspired and out of their mind and until their reason is no longer in them; but as long as this thing holds, every man is unable to compose and to prophesy. Therefore, since composing not by means of art and saying many beautiful things about the affairs, just as you about homer, but by means of a divine fate, each man is able to compose well only that onto which the Muse set him in motion—one composes dithyrambs, another encomiums, another songs accompanied by dance, another epics, another iambic poems; and each of them is insignificant with respect to the others. For they say these things not with art but divine power, since, if they were knowing how to speak well concerning one thing with art, they also would be concerning quite all the others; and through these things, the god, taking for itself the mind out of these men, treat them and the soothsayers and the divine seers as servants, in order that we the ones listening may know that the men speaking these things, so unworthy of much, are not those ones with whom reason is not present, but the god himself is the one speaking, and through these men, he speaks toward us. And a greatest token of proof with the word is Tynnichos of Chalkis, who never yet composed any other poem, on the one hand, of whichever someone would deem it worthy to make a mention; he composed the paean, on the other hand, which all sing of, practically best of all lyric poems, absolutely, the very thing which he himself says, “some invention of Muses.” For in this case, of course, the god most seems to me to demonstrate to us, in order that we may not doubt, that these beautiful poems are not pertaining to human beings, not even of humans, but divine and of gods, and that the poets are nothing other than interpreters of the gods, being possessed from whoever each is possessed. The god, demonstrating these things on purpose, sang the most beautiful poem through the most ordinary poet: do I seem to you to say true things or not, Ion?

Ion: Yes, by Zeus, it does to me at any rate; for you somehow touch my soul with your words, Socrates, and the good poets seem to me to interpret these things for us by means of a divine fate, from the side of the gods.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that you rhapsodes in turn interpret the things of the poets?

Ion: And you say this true.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that you turn out to be interpreters of interpreters?

Ion: Undoubtedly.

Socrates: Stay now, say this to me, Ion, and do not hide for yourself whatever I ask you: whenever you speak well epics, and you most astound the viewers, either you sing of Odysseus when leaping upon onto the threshold, becoming visible to the suitors and pouring out the arrows before his feet, or of Achilles rushing onto Hector, or of something even of the pitiable things concerning Andromache, or concerning Hecuba or concerning Priam, are you in your mind at that time, or do you become outside of yourself and does your soul, being inspired by a god, think that it is at the side of the things which you speak, either being in Ithaca or in Troy or anywhere the epics also hold?

Ion: How vivid this is to me, Socrates, you said the sure sign; for I will not say that I concealed from you. For whenever I say something pitiful, my eyes are filled of tears; and whenever something fearful or clever, my hairs stand up straight because of fear and my heart leaps.

Socrates: Then why? Are we to say, Ion, that that man is in his right mind at that time, whoever weeps in sacrifices and festivals although having been adorned with an embroidered dress and golden crowns, having lost nothing of these, or whoever is afraid when standing among more than twenty thousand friendly men, no one stripping and not wronging him?

Ion: No, by Zeus, certainly not, Socrates, so for the true things to have been said.

Socrates: Then, do you know that you all also do these same things to the many of the spectators?

Ion: And I know very well; for on each occasion, from above, away from the stage, I look down upon them, crying and gazing a marvelous look and being astounded by the things being said. For it is necessary for me to apply my mind even very much for them; since if, on the one hand, I cause them to cry, I myself will laugh, taking money; if, on the other hand, I cause them to laugh, I myself will cry, losing money.

Socrates: Then, do you know that this spectator is the last of the rings, which I was saying that takes the power from one another under the stone of Herakleia? And the middle ring is you, the rhapsode and actor, and the first is the poet himself; and the god, through all those ones, draws the soul of the human beings to wherever he wants, hanging up the power from one another. And just as from that stone, a very great chain has been fastened from dancers and directors and associate directors, them having been fastened sideways from the rings being hanged out from the Muse. And one of the poets has been fastened from one Muse, another from another—and we name it as “he is possessed,” it is similar; for he is held—and from those first rings, the poets, some in turn have been fastened from one and are inspired by a god, other from another, some from Orpheus, others from Mousaios; and the many are possessed and held from Homer. Of whom, you, Ion, are one and you are possessed from Homer, and whenever, on the one hand, someone sings a lyric poem of some other poet, you sleep and are at a loss what you are to say; whenever, on the other hand, someone speaks a lyric poem of this poet, you are immediately awake and your soul dances and you proper what you are to say; for you say what you say about Homer not by art and not knowledge, but by a divine fate and a state of being possessed, just as the ones being in a Korybantic frenzy perceive keenly that song alone whichever is of the god from whomever they are possessed, and they abound both in gestures and words for that song, but they do not take thought for the others; you also in this way, Ion, you prosper whenever someone mentions about, on the one hand, Homer; you are at a loss about, on the other hand, the others; and the cause of that, which you ask me why you prosper about, on the one hand, Homer, not about, on the other hand, the others, is that you are a clever praiser of Homer not by art but by a divine fate.

Ion: You, for your part, speak well, Socrates; however, I would be amazed if you should speak so well, so as to convince me that I, being possessed and being mad, praise Homer. And I think not even would I seem to you, if you should hear me speaking about Homer.

Socrates: And indeed, I am willing to listen, yet not earlier until you answer me this: of the things that Homer speaks, about what do you speak well? For, I suppose, not about quite all?

Ion: Know well, Socrates, about everything.

Socrates: Not, I suppose, even about the things which you, on the one hand, happen not to know; Homer, on the other hand, speaks.

Ion: And what sorts of things are those which Homer, on the one hand, speaks; I, on the other hand, do not know?

Socrates: And yet does Homer not say in many places also many things even about arts? For example, even about chariot-driving—if I remember his epics, I will point out to you.

Ion: But I will say; for I remember.

Socrates: Say now to me the things which Nestor says to Antilochus his son, when advising him to take care concerning the turning in his horse race for Patroclus.

Ion: “And also yourself lean,” he says, “on the well-polished chariot slightly onto the left of them; but goad the right-hand horse while cheering him on, and yield with hands the reins to him. But in the turning post, let me tell you, let the left-hand horse come near, in order that, you know, the hub may seem to come to the edge of the manufactured wheel; and avoid striking a stone.”

Socrates: It is sufficient. Now, Ion, which of two would recognize better whether Homer correctly speaks these words or not, a doctor or a charioteer?

Ion: A charioteer, of course.

Socrates: Since he has this art or on account of some other thing?

Ion: No, but since he has art.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that to be able to recognize some work has been given back to each of the arts by the god? For, I suppose, the things which we recognize by the pilot’s art we will not also recognize by the doctor’s art.

Ion: No, of course.

Socrates: The things which we recognize by the doctor’s art, these thing we will nor yet recognize by the carpenter’s art.

Ion: No, of course.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that thus throughout all the arts, the things which we recognize by one art, we will not recognize by the other? And answer me this earlier that that: do you say that one is some one art, another the other?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Just as I inferring, when one art is knowledge of one group of matters, another the other group, thus I call one one art, another another art, and are you in this way?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: For, I suppose, if there should be some knowledge of the same matters, why would we say that one is one art, another the other, whenever it should be possible to know the same things from both? Just as I recognize that these fingers are five, and you, just as I, recognize the same things concerning these; and if I should ask you whether I and you recognize the same things by the same arithmetical art or by another, you would say, I suppose, by the same art.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Therefore, the thing which just now I was able to ask you, now say, if throughout all the arts, it seems to you in this way, namely that it is necessary to recognize the same things by the same art, on the one hand, not the same things by the other art, on the other hand, but just if it is another art, it is necessary to also recognize the other things.

Ion: It seems to me in this way, Socrates.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that whoever does not have some art, he will not be able to recognize well the things being said or done of that art?

Ion: You speak true things.

Socrates: Therefore, concerning the words which you said, will you or a charioteer recognize better whether Homer speaks well or not?

Ion: A charioteer.

Socrates: For, I suppose, you are a rhapsode but not a charioteer?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: And is the rhapsode’s art other than the charioteer’s art?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Then if it is the other art, knowledge is also concerning the other things.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: And now, what about when Homer speaks how Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, presents a posset to Machaon, since having been wounded, to drink? And he somehow says thus— “To Pramnian wine,” she is saying, “and she was grating cheese of a goat with a cheese grater of bronze; and nearby is an onion, a relish for drink;” is to recognize well whether Homer speaks these things correctly or not characteristic of the doctor’s art or the rhapsode’s art?

Ion: Characteristic of a doctor’s art.

Socrates: What about, when Homer says— “And she was arriving into depths of the sea like a sinker, which, eager, comes on a horn of a bull dwelling in the field, bringing trouble among fish eating raw flesh; are we to say that it is characteristic of an art pertaining to fishing or the rhapsode’s art to judge more these thing, what they say and whether well or not?

Ion: It is clear, of course, Socrates, that of an art pertaining to fishing.

Socrates: Consider, now, you asking, if you should ask me: “Therefore, Socrates, since you discover of these arts in Homer the things which it is fitting for each to distinguish, come on, find out for me also the things which are characteristic of the prophet and the art of prophesy, what sorts are the things which it is fitting for them to be able to distinguish, whether they have been composed well or badly”— consider how easily and true things I will answer you. For in many places, on the one hand, and in the Odyssey Homer speaks, for example also the things which the prophet of the descendants of Malampus, Theoclymenos, says toward the suitors— “O strange men, what this evil do you suffer? Your heads and faces and limbs below have been enveloped by night, and your lamentation has blazed forth, and your cheeks has been wet with tears; a porch is full of ghosts, and also a courtyard is full of them desiring to Erebos under the gloom of the underworld; and the sun has perished out of sky, and an evil mist has ran over;” in many places, on the other hand, and in the Iliad, for example also on a fight at the wall; for Homer says even there— “For a bird came upon to them eager about to traverse, a high-flying eagle, passing along the army on the left hand side, bearing a monstrous bloody-red snake with talons, it alive, still struggling; and not yet was is forgetting joy in battle. For bending backwards, it struck the eagle, holding, on its breast to the side of its neck, and the eagle let it go away from itself to the ground, suffering with pains, and it threw it down in the middle of the crowd; and itself screaming, was flying in breezes of wind;” I will say that it is fitting for the prophet both to examine and judge also these sorts of things.

Ion: You saying true things, Socrates.

Socrates: And you, Ion, speak these things true. Come on, and you for me, just as I picked out for you both from the Odyssey and from the Iliad what sorts of things are characteristic of the prophet and what sorts of the doctor and whats sorts of the fisherman, also in this way you, pick out for me, since you are even more experienced than me in the works of Homer, what sorts of things are characteristic of the rhapsode, Ion, and of the rhapsode’s art, the things which it is fitting for the rhapsode both to examine and to distinguish beyond the other men.

Ion: I, for my part, say, Socrates, quite all things.

Socrates: But you do not say, Ion, quite all things; or are you forgetful in this way? And further, it would not be fitting for a rhapsode man to be forgetful.

Ion: But what, in fact, do I forget?

Socrates: Do you not remember that you were saying that the rhapsode’s art is other than the charioteer’s art?

Ion: I remember.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that you were also agreeing that an art, being other, will recognize other things?

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: Then, according to your speech, the rhapsode’s art will not recognize all things, and not will the rhapsode.

Ion: Except perhaps those sorts of things, Socrates.

Socrates: And you speak those sorts of things except practically the things of the other arts; but what sorts of things, in fact, will you recognize, since not quite all?

Ion: The things which it is fitting, I think, for a man to say and what sorts of things for a woman, and what sorts for a slave and what sorts for a freeman, and what sorts for one being ruled and what sorts for one ruling.

Socrates: Will the rhapsode recognize better than the helmsman what sorts of things it is fitting for one ruling a ship being storm-tossed in sea, as you say, to speak?

Ion: No, but the helmsman will better recognize this thing, at any rate.

Socrates: But will the rhapsode recognize better than the doctor what sorts of thing it is fitting for one ruling a sick man to say?

Ion: Not even this.

Socrates: As for example you say the things which it is fitting for a cowherd slave to say, soothing, cows being angry, will the rhapsode recognize but not the cowherd?

Ion: No, of course.

Socrates: But what about the sorts of things which it is fitting for a woman wool-worker to say concerning working of wools?

Ion: No.

Socrates: But will he recognize the sorts of things which it is fitting for a man general to say, exhorting soldiers?

Ion: Yes, the rhapsode will recognize these sorts of things.

Socrates: But why? Is the rhapsode’s art the general’s art?

Ion: At least then I would recognize the sorts of things which it is fitting for a general to say.

Socrates: For perhaps you are also skilled in generalship, Ion. And in fact, if you were happening to be trained in horsemanship, at the same time also trained in kithara-playing, you would recognize horses, when being ridden well and badly; but if I had asked you: “By means of which skill, in fact, Ion, do you recognize the horses being ridden well? By means of which you are a horseman or by means of which a kithara player?” What would you have answered me?

Ion: By means of which a horseman, I would answer.

Socrates: Therefore, if you were also distinguishing the ones playing the kithara well, you would be agreeing that you recognize by means of that art which you are a kithara player, but not which you are a horseman.

Ion: Yes.

Socrates: And since you recognize the things pertaining to generalship, do you recognize by means of an art which you are skilled in generalship or which you are a good rhapsode?

Ion: It not at all seems to me to be different.

Socrates: How? Do you say that nothing is different? Do you say that the rhapsode’s art and the general’s art is one art or two?

Ion: It seems to me to be one.

Socrates: Therefore, whoever is a good rhapsode, that man also happens to be a good general?

Ion: Very much so, Socrates.

Socrates: And therefore, whoever happens to be a good general is also a good rhapsode?

Ion: Certainly.

Socrates: Isn’t it the case that you are a best rhapsode of the Greeks?

Ion: By far, Socrates.

Socrates: Are you truly, Ion, a best general of the Greek?

Ion: Know well, Socrates; and also these things, learning from works of Homer.

Socrates: Then why ever, in fact, in the name of the gods, Ion, being best of the Greeks with respect to both, do you, both a general and a rhapsode, going around, recite epic poems, on the one hand, to the Greeks, not rule as a general, on the other hand? Or does it seem to you to be much need to the Greeks of a rhapsode, on the one hand, having been crowned with a golden wreath, no need of a general, on the other hand?

Ion: For our city, on the one hand, Socrates, is ruled by you all and is supplied with generals and not at all stands in need of a general; your city, on the other hand, and the city of Spartans would not choose me as a general; for they themselves think that they are sufficient.

Socrates: Best Ion, do you not know Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

Ion: What sort of man is this?

Socrates: Whom Athenians very often have chosen as a general of themselves, although being a foreigner; also Phanosthenes of Andros and Heracleides of Clazomenae, whom, although being foreigners, by demonstrating that they are worthy of speech, this city leads both into offices of generalship and into the other offices; and truly will it not choose and honor Ion of Ephesos as a general, if he seems to be worthy of speech? But why? Are the men of Ephesos not Athenians, on the one hand, long ago, and is Ephesos less than any city? But actually, you, Ion, if on the one hand you say true things, namely that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do wrong, you whoever professing to me that you know many beautiful things about Homer and saying that you will display, you deceive me and you are far from displaying, you who are not even not willing to say what those things are about which you are clever, me beseeching long ago, but truly just like Proteus, you become of every sort, turning up and down, until, finally getting away from me, you turn up as a general, in order that you may not display how you are clever concerning the wisdom of Homer. If then, on the one hand, being skilled, the thing just which I was saying, professing to display about Homer, you deceive me, you are unjust; if, on the other hand, you are not skilled, but by means of a divine fate, being possessed from Homer, knowing nothing, you speak many beautiful things about the poet, just as I spoke about you, you not at all do wrong. Therefore, choose whether you want to be thought by us that you are an unjust man or a divine man.

Ion: It is by far different, Socrates; for being thought that I am divine is by far better.

Socrates: Accordingly, this better thing exists for you at the side of us, Socrates, that is for you to be a divine and not skilled praiser about Homer.

Note: The Greek text below is from:

Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903.

Credits to the Perseus Digital Library for digitalizing the work.

[530a] Σωκράτης: τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν. πόθεν τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεδήμηκας; ἢ οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἐφέσου;

Ἴων: οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου ἐκ τῶν Ἀσκληπιείων.

Σωκράτης: μῶν καὶ ῥαψῳδῶν ἀγῶνα τιθέασιν τῷ θεῷ οἱ Ἐπιδαύριοι;

Ἴων: πάνυ γε, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης γε μουσικῆς.

Σωκράτης: τί οὖν; ἠγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; καὶ πῶς τι ἠγωνίσω;

[530b] Ἴων: τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἄθλων ἠνεγκάμεθα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σωκράτης: εὖ λέγεις: ἄγε δὴ ὅπως καὶ τὰ Παναθήναια νικήσομεν.

Ἴων: ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

Σωκράτης: καὶ μὴν πολλάκις γε ἐζήλωσα ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥαψῳδούς, ὦ Ἴων, τῆς τέχνης: τὸ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν τὸ σῶμα κεκοσμῆσθαι ἀεὶ πρέπον ὑμῶν εἶναι τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ ὡς καλλίστοις φαίνεσθαι, ἅμα δὲ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔν τε ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς διατρίβειν πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ὁμήρῳ, τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ θειοτάτῳ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ τὴν τούτου διάνοιαν ἐκμανθάνειν, μὴ μόνον τὰ ἔπη, ζηλωτόν ἐστιν. οὐ [530c] γὰρ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε ἀγαθὸς ῥαψῳδός, εἰ μὴ συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ. τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἑρμηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι: τοῦτο δὲ καλῶς ποιεῖν μὴ γιγνώσκοντα ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς ἀδύνατον. ταῦτα οὖν πάντα ἄξια ζηλοῦσθαι.

Ἴων: ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἐμοὶ γοῦν τοῦτο πλεῖστον ἔργον παρέσχεν τῆς τέχνης, καὶ οἶμαι κάλλιστα ἀνθρώπων λέγειν περὶ Ὁμήρου, ὡς οὔτε Μητρόδωρος ὁ [530d] Λαμψακηνὸς οὔτε Στησίμβροτος ὁ Θάσιος οὔτε Γλαύκων οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὁμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ.

Σωκράτης: εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Ἴων: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ φθονήσεις μοι ἐπιδεῖξαι.

Ἴων: καὶ μὴν ἄξιόν γε ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ κεκόσμηκα τὸν Ὅμηρον: ὥστε οἶμαι ὑπὸ Ὁμηριδῶν ἄξιος εἶναι χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ στεφανωθῆναι.

Σωκράτης: καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔτι ποιήσομαι σχολὴν ἀκροάσασθαί [531a] σου, νῦν δέ μοι τοσόνδε ἀπόκριναι: πότερον περὶ Ὁμήρου μόνον δεινὸς εἶ ἢ καὶ περὶ Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου;

Ἴων: οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ περὶ Ὁμήρου μόνον: ἱκανὸν γάρ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

Σωκράτης: ἔστι δὲ περὶ ὅτου Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος ταὐτὰ λέγετον;

Ἴων: οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ πολλά.

Σωκράτης: πότερον οὖν περὶ τούτων κάλλιον ἂν ἐξηγήσαιο ἃ Ὅμηρος λέγει ἢ ἃ Ἡσίοδος;

Ἴων: ὁμοίως ἂν περί γε τούτων, ὦ [531b] Σώκρατες, περὶ ὧν ταὐτὰ λέγουσιν.

Σωκράτης: τί δὲ ὧν πέρι μὴ ταὐτὰ λέγουσιν; οἷον περὶ μαντικῆς λέγει τι Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἡσίοδος.

Ἴων: πάνυ γε.

Σωκράτης: τί οὖν; ὅσα τε ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσα διαφόρως περὶ μαντικῆς λέγετον τὼ ποιητὰ τούτω, πότερον σὺ κάλλιον ἂν ἐξηγήσαιο ἢ τῶν μάντεών τις τῶν ἀγαθῶν;

Ἴων: τῶν μάντεων.

Σωκράτης: εἰ δὲ σὺ ἦσθα μάντις, οὐκ, εἴπερ περὶ τῶν ὁμοίως λεγομένων οἷός τ᾽ ἦσθα ἐξηγήσασθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν διαφόρως λεγομένων ἠπίστω ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι;

Ἴων: δῆλον ὅτι.

[531c] Σωκράτης: τί οὖν ποτε περὶ μὲν Ὁμήρου δεινὸς εἶ, περὶ δὲ Ἡσιόδου οὔ, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν; ἢ Ὅμηρος περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν λέγει ἢ ὧνπερ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί; οὐ περὶ πολέμου τε τὰ πολλὰ διελήλυθεν καὶ περὶ ὁμιλιῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ δημιουργῶν, καὶ περὶ θεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὁμιλούντων, ὡς ὁμιλοῦσι, καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων παθημάτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, καὶ γενέσεις καὶ θεῶν [531d] καὶ ἡρώων; οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι περὶ ὧν Ὅμηρος τὴν ποίησιν πεποίηκεν;

Ἴων: ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σωκράτης: τί δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί; οὐ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων;

Ἴων: ναί, ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁμοίως πεποιήκασι καὶ Ὅμηρος.

Σωκράτης: τί μήν; κάκιον;

Ἴων: πολύ γε.

Σωκράτης: Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄμεινον;

Ἴων: ἄμεινον μέντοι νὴ Δία.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ Ἴων, ὅταν περὶ ἀριθμοῦ πολλῶν λεγόντων εἷς τις ἄριστα λέγῃ, γνώσεται δήπου τις [531e] τὸν εὖ λέγοντα;

Ἴων: φημί.

Σωκράτης: πότερον οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ὅσπερ καὶ τοὺς κακῶς λέγοντας, ἢ ἄλλος;

Ἴων: ὁ αὐτὸς δήπου.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ὁ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν τέχνην ἔχων οὗτός ἐστιν;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: τί δ᾽; ὅταν πολλῶν λεγόντων περὶ ὑγιεινῶν σιτίων ὁποῖά ἐστιν, εἷς τις ἄριστα λέγῃ, πότερον ἕτερος μέν τις τὸν ἄριστα λέγοντα γνώσεται ὅτι ἄριστα λέγει, ἕτερος δὲ τὸν κάκιον ὅτι κάκιον, ἢ ὁ αὐτός;

Ἴων: δῆλον δήπου, ὁ αὐτός.

Σωκράτης: τίς οὗτος; τί ὄνομα αὐτῷ;

Ἴων: ἰατρός.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς γνώσεται ἀεί, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλῶν λεγόντων, [532a] ὅστις τε εὖ λέγει καὶ ὅστις κακῶς: ἢ εἰ μὴ γνώσεται τὸν κακῶς λέγοντα, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν εὖ, περί γε τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Ἴων: οὕτως.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς γίγνεται δεινὸς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν σὺ φῂς καὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητάς, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ἀρχίλοχός ἐστιν, περί γε τῶν αὐτῶν λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν εὖ γε, τοὺς δὲ χεῖρον;

Ἴων: καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγω.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ τὸν εὖ λέγοντα γιγνώσκεις, [532b] καὶ τοὺς χεῖρον λέγοντας γιγνώσκοις ἂν ὅτι χεῖρον λέγουσιν.

Ἴων: ἔοικέν γε.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὁμοίως τὸν Ἴωνα λέγοντες περὶ Ὁμήρου τε δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν οὐχ ἁμαρτησόμεθα, ἐπειδή γε αὐτὸς ὁμολογῇ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι κριτὴν ἱκανὸν πάντων ὅσοι ἂν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγωσι, τοὺς δὲ ποιητὰς σχεδὸν ἅπαντας τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν.

Ἴων: τί οὖν ποτε τὸ αἴτιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν μέν τις περὶ ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ διαλέγηται, οὔτε προσέχω [532c] τὸν νοῦν ἀδυνατῶ τε καὶ ὁτιοῦν συμβαλέσθαι λόγου ἄξιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς νυστάζω, ἐπειδὰν δέ τις περὶ Ὁμήρου μνησθῇ, εὐθύς τε ἐγρήγορα καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν καὶ εὐπορῶ ὅτι λέγω;

Σωκράτης: οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτό γε εἰκάσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγειν ἀδύνατος εἶ: εἰ γὰρ τέχνῃ οἷός τε ἦσθα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν ἁπάντων λέγειν οἷός τ᾽ ἂν ἦσθα: ποιητικὴ γάρ πού ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον. ἢ οὔ;

Ἴων: ναί.

[532d] Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν λάβῃ τις καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ὅλην, ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεως ἔσται περὶ ἁπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν; πῶς τοῦτο λέγω, δέῃ τί μου ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Ἴων;

Ἴων: ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε: χαίρω γὰρ ἀκούων ὑμῶν τῶν σοφῶν.

Σωκράτης: βουλοίμην ἄν σε ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων: ἀλλὰ σοφοὶ μέν πού ἐστε ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ᾁδετε τὰ ποιήματα, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τἀληθῆ λέγω, [532e] οἷον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον. ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τούτου οὗ νῦν ἠρόμην σε, θέασαι ὡς φαῦλον καὶ ἰδιωτικόν ἐστι καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι ὃ ἔλεγον, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι σκέψιν, ἐπειδάν τις ὅλην τέχνην λάβῃ. λάβωμεν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ: γραφικὴ γάρ τίς ἐστι τέχνη τὸ ὅλον;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν καὶ γραφῆς πολλοὶ καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασιν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ φαῦλοι;

Ἴων: πάνυ γε.

Σωκράτης: ἤδη οὖν τινα εἶδες ὅστις περὶ μὲν Πολυγνώτου τοῦ Ἀγλαοφῶντος δεινός ἐστιν ἀποφαίνειν ἃ εὖ τε γράφει καὶ ἃ μή, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων γραφέων [533a] ἀδύνατος; καὶ ἐπειδὰν μέν τις τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζωγράφων ἔργα ἐπιδεικνύῃ, νυστάζει τε καὶ ἀπορεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὅτι συμβάληται, ἐπειδὰν δὲ περὶ Πολυγνώτου ἢ ἄλλου ὅτου βούλει τῶν γραφέων ἑνὸς μόνου δέῃ ἀποφήνασθαι γνώμην, ἐγρήγορέν τε καὶ προσέχει τὸν νοῦν καὶ εὐπορεῖ ὅτι εἴπῃ;

Ἴων: οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ δῆτα.

Σωκράτης: τί δέ; ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ ἤδη τιν᾽ εἶδες ὅστις περὶ μὲν Δαιδάλου τοῦ Μητίονος [533b] ἢ Ἐπειοῦ τοῦ Πανοπέως ἢ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Σαμίου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ ἑνὸς πέρι δεινός ἐστιν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἃ εὖ πεποίηκεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδριαντοποιῶν ἔργοις ἀπορεῖ τε καὶ νυστάζει, οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴπῃ;

Ἴων: οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἑώρακα.

Σωκράτης: ἀλλὰ μήν, ὥς γ᾽ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐδ᾽ ἐν αὐλήσει γε οὐδὲ ἐν κιθαρίσει οὐδὲ ἐν κιθαρῳδίᾳ οὐδὲ ἐν ῥαψῳδίᾳ οὐδεπώποτ᾽ εἶδες ἄνδρα ὅστις περὶ μὲν Ὀλύμπου δεινός ἐστιν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ περὶ Θαμύρου ἢ περὶ [533c] Ὀρφέως ἢ περὶ Φημίου τοῦ Ἰθακησίου ῥαψῳδοῦ, περὶ δὲ Ἴωνος τοῦ Ἐφεσίου ῥαψῳδοῦ ἀπορεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἔχει συμβαλέσθαι ἅ τε εὖ ῥαψῳδεῖ καὶ ἃ μή.

Ἴων: οὐκ ἔχω σοι περὶ τούτου ἀντιλέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα, ὅτι περὶ Ὁμήρου κάλλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπων λέγω καὶ εὐπορῶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες μέ φασιν εὖ λέγειν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὔ. καίτοι ὅρα τοῦτο τί ἔστιν.

Σωκράτης: καὶ ὁρῶ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ ἔρχομαί γέ σοι ἀποφανούμενος [533d] ὅ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὂν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου εὖ λέγειν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δύναμις ἥ σε κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ ἣν Εὐριπίδης μὲν Μαγνῆτιν ὠνόμασεν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ Ἡρακλείαν. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ λίθος οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις ὥστ᾽ αὖ δύνασθαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους [533e] ἄγειν δακτυλίους, ὥστ᾽ ἐνίοτε ὁρμαθὸς μακρὸς πάνυ σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἤρτηται: πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἡ δύναμις ἀνήρτηται. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Μοῦσα ἐνθέους μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλων ἐνθουσιαζόντων ὁρμαθὸς ἐξαρτᾶται. πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ᾽ ἔνθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες [534a] οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὰν ἐμβῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ εἰς τὸν ῥυθμόν, βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι, ὥσπερ αἱ βάκχαι ἀρύονται ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι καὶ γάλα κατεχόμεναι, ἔμφρονες δὲ οὖσαι οὔ, καὶ τῶν μελοποιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι. λέγουσι γὰρ δήπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι [534b] ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι: καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσι. κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστιν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ: ἕως δ᾽ ἂν τουτὶ ἔχῃ τὸ κτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ χρησμῳδεῖν. ἅτε οὖν οὐ τέχνῃ ποιοῦντες καὶ πολλὰ λέγοντες καὶ καλὰ περὶ [534c] τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ σὺ περὶ Ὁμήρου, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, τοῦτο μόνον οἷός τε ἕκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἡ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δ᾽ ἔπη, ὁ δ᾽ ἰάμβους: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα φαῦλος αὐτῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ θείᾳ δυνάμει, ἐπεί, εἰ περὶ ἑνὸς τέχνῃ καλῶς ἠπίσταντο λέγειν, κἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων: διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτοις χρῆται ὑπηρέταις καὶ [534d] τοῖς χρησμῳδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ θεὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς. μέγιστον δὲ τεκμήριον τῷ λόγῳ Τύννιχος ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν πώποτε ἐποίησε ποίημα ὅτου τις ἂν ἀξιώσειεν μνησθῆναι, τὸν δὲ παίωνα ὃν πάντες ᾁδουσι, σχεδόν τι πάντων μελῶν κάλλιστον, ἀτεχνῶς, ὅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει, [534e] “εὕρημά τι Μοισᾶν.” ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ δὴ μάλιστά μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι ἡμῖν, ἵνα μὴ διστάζωμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπινά ἐστιν τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα ποιήματα οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ θεῖα καὶ θεῶν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἑρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν, κατεχόμενοι ἐξ ὅτου ἂν ἕκαστος κατέχηται. ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεὸς ἐξεπίτηδες διὰ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου [535a] ποιητοῦ τὸ κάλλιστον μέλος ᾖσεν: ἢ οὐ δοκῶ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων;

Ἴων: ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔμοιγε: ἅπτει γάρ πώς μου τοῖς λόγοις τῆς ψυχῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, καί μοι δοκοῦσι θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ταῦτα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἑρμηνεύειν.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς αὖ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἑρμηνεύετε;

Ἴων: καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ἑρμηνέων ἑρμηνῆς γίγνεσθε;

Ἴων: παντάπασί γε.

[535b] Σωκράτης: ἔχε δή μοι τόδε εἰπέ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅτι ἄν σε ἔρωμαι: ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη καὶ ἐκπλήξῃς μάλιστα τοὺς θεωμένους, ἢ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸν οὐδὸν ἐφαλλόμενον ᾁδῃς, ἐκφανῆ γιγνόμενον τοῖς μνηστῆρσι καὶ ἐκχέοντα τοὺς ὀιστοὺς πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα ἐπὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα ὁρμῶντα, ἢ καὶ τῶν περὶ Ἀνδρομάχην ἐλεινῶν τι ἢ περὶ Ἑκάβην ἢ περὶ Πρίαμον, τότε πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ ἢ ἔξω [535c] σαυτοῦ γίγνῃ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἴεταί σου εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ οἷς λέγεις ἐνθουσιάζουσα, ἢ ἐν Ἰθάκῃ οὖσιν ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἢ ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὰ ἔπη ἔχῃ;

Ἴων: ὡς ἐναργές μοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τεκμήριον εἶπες: οὐ γάρ σε ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλεινόν τι λέγω, δακρύων ἐμπίμπλανταί μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί: ὅταν τε φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ.

[535d] Σωκράτης: τί οὖν; φῶμεν, ὦ Ἴων, ἔμφρονα εἶναι τότε τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃς ἂν κεκοσμημένος ἐσθῆτι ποικίλῃ καὶ χρυσοῖσι στεφάνοις κλάῃ τ᾽ ἐν θυσίαις καὶ ἑορταῖς, μηδὲν ἀπολωλεκὼς τούτων, ἢ φοβῆται πλέον ἢ ἐν δισμυρίοις ἀνθρώποις ἑστηκὼς φιλίοις, μηδενὸς ἀποδύοντος μηδὲ ἀδικοῦντος;

Ἴων: οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς γε τἀληθὲς εἰρῆσθαι.

Σωκράτης: οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῶν θεατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑμεῖς ἐργάζεσθε;

[535e] Ἴων: καὶ μάλα καλῶς οἶδα: καθορῶ γὰρ ἑκάστοτε αὐτοὺς ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος κλάοντάς τε καὶ δεινὸν ἐμβλέποντας καὶ συνθαμβοῦντας τοῖς λεγομένοις. δεῖ γάρ με καὶ σφόδρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν: ὡς ἐὰν μὲν κλάοντας αὐτοὺς καθίσω, αὐτὸς γελάσομαι ἀργύριον λαμβάνων, ἐὰν δὲ γελῶντας, αὐτὸς κλαύσομαι ἀργύριον ἀπολλύς.

Σωκράτης: οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατὴς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος, ὧν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλειώτιδος λίθου ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν λαμβάνειν; ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ [536a] ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής: ὁ δὲ θεὸς διὰ πάντων τούτων ἕλκει τὴν ψυχὴν ὅποι ἂν βούληται τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀνακρεμαννὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς λίθου ἐκείνης ὁρμαθὸς πάμπολυς ἐξήρτηται χορευτῶν τε καὶ διδασκάλων καὶ ὑποδιδασκάλων, ἐκ πλαγίου ἐξηρτημένων τῶν τῆς Μούσης ἐκκρεμαμένων δακτυλίων. καὶ ὁ μὲν τῶν ποιητῶν ἐξ ἄλλης Μούσης, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἄλλης ἐξήρτηται—ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται, τὸ δέ [536b] ἐστι παραπλήσιον: ἔχεται γάρ—ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν πρώτων δακτυλίων, τῶν ποιητῶν, ἄλλοι ἐξ ἄλλου αὖ ἠρτημένοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐξ Ὀρφέως, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Μουσαίου: οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐξ Ὁμήρου κατέχονταί τε καὶ ἔχονται. ὧν σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἷς εἶ καὶ κατέχῃ ἐξ Ὁμήρου, καὶ ἐπειδὰν μέν τις ἄλλου του ποιητοῦ ᾁδῃ, καθεύδεις τε καὶ ἀπορεῖς ὅτι λέγῃς, ἐπειδὰν δὲ τούτου τοῦ ποιητοῦ φθέγξηταί τις μέλος, εὐθὺς ἐγρήγορας καὶ ὀρχεῖταί σου ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ εὐπορεῖς ὅτι [536c] λέγῃς: οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγεις ἃ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ καὶ κατοκωχῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὀξέως ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν: οὕτω καὶ σύ, ὦ Ἴων, περὶ μὲν Ὁμήρου ὅταν τις μνησθῇ, εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπορεῖς: [536d] τούτου δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον, ὅ μ᾽ ἐρωτᾷς, δι᾽ ὅτι σὺ περὶ μὲν Ὁμήρου εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ Ὁμήρου δεινὸς εἶ ἐπαινέτης.

Ἴων: σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες: θαυμάζοιμι μεντἂν εἰ οὕτως εὖ εἴποις, ὥστε με ἀναπεῖσαι ὡς ἐγὼ κατεχόμενος καὶ μαινόμενος Ὅμηρον ἐπαινῶ. οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν σοὶ δόξαιμι, εἴ μου ἀκούσαις λέγοντος περὶ Ὁμήρου.

Σωκράτης: καὶ μὴν ἐθέλω γε ἀκοῦσαι, οὐ μέντοι πρότερον [536e] πρὶν ἄν μοι ἀποκρίνῃ τόδε: ὧν Ὅμηρος λέγει περὶ τίνος εὖ λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ δήπου περὶ ἁπάντων γε.

Ἴων: εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὔ.

Σωκράτης: οὐ δήπου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὧν σὺ μὲν τυγχάνεις οὐκ εἰδώς, Ὅμηρος δὲ λέγει.

Ἴων: καὶ ταῦτα ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ Ὅμηρος μὲν λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ οἶδα;

[537a] Σωκράτης: οὐ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν μέντοι λέγει πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος καὶ πολλά; οἷον καὶ περὶ ἡνιοχείας—ἐὰν μνησθῶ τὰ ἔπη, ἐγώ σοι φράσω.

Ἴων: ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐρῶ: ἐγὼ γὰρ μέμνημαι.

Σωκράτης: εἰπὲ δή μοι ἃ λέγει Νέστωρ Ἀντιλόχῳ τῷ ὑεῖ, παραινῶν εὐλαβηθῆναι περὶ τὴν καμπὴν ἐν τῇ ἱπποδρομίᾳ τῇ ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ.

Ἴων:

“κλινθῆναι δέ, φησί, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐυξέστῳ ἐνὶ δίφρῳ

[537b] ἦκ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ τοῖιν: ἀτὰρ τὸν δεξιὸν ἵππον

κένσαι ὁμοκλήσας, εἶξαί τέ οἱ ἡνία χερσίν.

ἐν νύσσῃ δέ τοι ἵππος ἀριστερὸς ἐγχριμφθήτω,

ὡς ἄν τοι πλήμνη γε δοάσσεται ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι

κύκλου ποιητοῖο: λίθου δ᾽ ἀλέασθαι ἐπαυρεῖν.”

[537c] Σωκράτης: ἀρκεῖ. ταῦτα δή, ὦ Ἴων, τὰ ἔπη εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, πότερος ἂν γνοίη ἄμεινον, ἰατρὸς ἢ ἡνίοχος;

Ἴων: Ἡνίοχος δήπου.

Σωκράτης: πότερον ὅτι τέχνην ταύτην ἔχει ἢ κατ᾽ ἄλλο τι;

Ἴων: οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τέχνην.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἀποδέδοταί τι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργον οἵᾳ τε εἶναι γιγνώσκειν; οὐ γάρ που ἃ κυβερνητικῇ γιγνώσκομεν, γνωσόμεθα καὶ ἰατρικῇ.

Ἴων: οὐ δῆτα.

Σωκράτης: οὐδέ γε ἃ ἰατρικῇ, ταῦτα καὶ τεκτονικῇ.

[537d] Ἴων: οὐ δῆτα.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τέχνῃ γιγνώσκομεν, οὐ γνωσόμεθα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ; τόδε δέ μοι πρότερον τούτου ἀπόκριναι: τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν φῂς εἶναί τινα τέχνην, τὴν δ᾽ ἑτέραν;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: ἆρα ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τεκμαιρόμενος, ὅταν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρων πραγμάτων ᾖ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρων, οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην [537e] τέχνην, οὕτω καὶ σύ;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: εἰ γάρ που τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμη εἴη τις, τί ἂν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν φαῖμεν εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ ἑτέραν, ὁπότε γε ταὐτὰ εἴη εἰδέναι ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων; ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε γιγνώσκω ὅτι πέντε εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ δάκτυλοι, καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, περὶ τούτων ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκεις: καὶ εἴ σε ἐγὼ ἐροίμην εἰ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ γιγνώσκομεν τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἢ ἄλλῃ, φαίης ἂν δήπου τῇ αὐτῇ.

Ἴων: ναί.

[538a] Σωκράτης: ὃ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔμελλον ἐρήσεσθαί σε, νυνὶ εἰπέ, εἰ κατὰ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ, τῇ μὲν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γιγνώσκειν, τῇ δ᾽ ἑτέρᾳ μὴ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἄλλη ἐστίν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἕτερα γιγνώσκειν.

Ἴων: οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ τινὰ τέχνην, ταύτης τῆς τέχνης τὰ λεγόμενα ἢ πραττόμενα καλῶς γιγνώσκειν οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσται;

[538b] Ἴων: ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σωκράτης: πότερον οὖν περὶ τῶν ἐπῶν ὧν εἶπες, εἴτε καλῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, σὺ κάλλιον γνώσῃ ἢ ἡνίοχος;

Ἴων: Ἡνίοχος.

Σωκράτης: Ῥαψῳδὸς γάρ που εἶ ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡνίοχος.

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: ἡ δὲ ῥαψῳδικὴ τέχνη ἑτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς ἡνιοχικῆς;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: εἰ ἄρα ἑτέρα, περὶ ἑτέρων καὶ ἐπιστήμη πραγμάτων ἐστίν.

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: τί δὲ δὴ ὅταν Ὅμηρος λέγῃ ὡς τετρωμένῳ τῷ Μαχάονι Ἑκαμήδη ἡ Νέστορος παλλακὴ κυκεῶνα πίνειν [538c] δίδωσι; καὶ λέγει πως οὕτως—

“οἴνῳ πραμνείῳ, φησίν, ἐπὶ δ᾽ αἴγειον κνῆ τυρὸν

κνήστι χαλκείῃ: παρὰ δὲ κρόμυον ποτῷ ὄψον:”

ταῦτα εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, πότερον ἰατρικῆς ἐστι διαγνῶναι καλῶς ἢ ῥαψῳδικῆς;

Ἴων: Ἰατρικῆς.

Σωκράτης: τί δέ, ὅταν λέγῃ Ὅμηρος—

[538d] “ἡ δὲ μολυβδαίνῃ ἰκέλη ἐς βυσσὸν ἵκανεν,

ἥ τε κατ᾽ ἀγραύλοιο βοὸς κέρας ἐμμεμαυῖα

ἔρχεται ὠμηστῇσι μετ᾽ ἰχθύσι πῆμα φέρουσα:”

ταῦτα πότερον φῶμεν ἁλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μᾶλλον κρῖναι ἢ ῥαψῳδικῆς, ἅττα λέγει καὶ εἴτε καλῶς εἴτε μή;

Ἴων: δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἁλιευτικῆς.

Σωκράτης: σκέψαι δή, σοῦ ἐρομένου, εἰ ἔροιό με: ‘ἐπειδὴ [538e] τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν Ὁμήρῳ εὑρίσκεις ἃ προσήκει ἑκάστῃ διακρίνειν, ἴθι μοι ἔξευρε καὶ τὰ τοῦ μάντεώς τε καὶ μαντικῆς, ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ προσήκει αὐτῷ οἵῳ τ᾽ εἶναι διαγιγνώσκειν, εἴτε εὖ εἴτε κακῶς πεποίηται’ — σκέψαι ὡς ῥᾳδίως τε καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐγώ σοι ἀποκρινοῦμαι. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ λέγει, οἷον καὶ ἃ ὁ τῶν Μελαμποδιδῶν λέγει μάντις πρὸς τοὺς μνηστῆρας, Θεοκλύμενος—

[539a] “δαιμόνιοι, τί κακὸν τόδε πάσχετε; νυκτὶ μὲν ὑμέων

εἰλύαται κεφαλαί τε πρόσωπά τε νέρθε τε γυῖα,

οἰμωγὴ δὲ δέδηε, δεδάκρυνται δὲ παρειαί:

εἰδώλων τε πλέον πρόθυρον, πλείη δὲ καὶ αὐλὴ

ἱεμένων ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον: ἠέλιος δὲ

[539b] οὐρανοῦ ἐξαπόλωλε, κακὴ δ᾽ ἐπιδέδρομεν ἀχλύς:”

πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τειχομαχίᾳ: λέγει γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα—

“ὄρνις γάρ σφιν ἐπῆλθε περησέμεναι μεμαῶσιν,

αἰετὸς ὑψιπέτης, ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ λαὸν ἐέργων,

[539c] φοινήεντα δράκοντα φέρων ὀνύχεσσι πέλωρον,

ζῷον, ἔτ᾽ ἀσπαίροντα: καὶ οὔπω λήθετο χάρμης.

κόψε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔχοντα κατὰ στῆθος παρὰ δειρὴν

ἰδνωθεὶς ὀπίσω, ὁ δ᾽ ἀπὸ ἕθεν ἧκε χαμᾶζε

ἀλγήσας ὀδύνῃσι, μέσῳ δ᾽ ἐνὶ κάββαλ᾽ ὁμίλῳ:

[539d] αὐτὸς δὲ κλάγξας πέτετο πνοιῇς ἀνέμοιο.”

ταῦτα φήσω καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῷ μάντει προσήκειν καὶ σκοπεῖν καὶ κρίνειν.

Ἴων: ἀληθῆ γε σὺ λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σωκράτης: καὶ σύ γε, ὦ Ἴων, ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμοί, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐξέλεξα καὶ ἐξ Ὀδυσσείας καὶ ἐξ Ἰλιάδος ὁποῖα τοῦ μάντεώς ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα τοῦ ἰατροῦ καὶ [539e] ὁποῖα τοῦ ἁλιέως, οὕτω καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ ἔκλεξον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐμπειρότερος εἶ ἐμοῦ τῶν Ὁμήρου, ὁποῖα τοῦ ῥαψῳδοῦ ἐστιν, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ῥαψῳδικῆς, ἃ τῷ ῥαψῳδῷ προσήκει καὶ σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ διακρίνειν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους.

Ἴων: ἐγὼ μέν φημι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἅπαντα.

Σωκράτης: οὐ σύ γε φῄς, ὦ Ἴων, ἅπαντα: ἢ οὕτως ἐπιλήσμων εἶ; καίτοι οὐκ ἂν πρέποι γε ἐπιλήσμονα εἶναι ῥαψῳδὸν ἄνδρα.

[540a] Ἴων: τί δὲ δὴ ἐπιλανθάνομαι;

Σωκράτης: οὐ μέμνησαι ὅτι ἔφησθα τὴν ῥαψῳδικὴν τέχνην ἑτέραν εἶναι τῆς ἡνιοχικῆς;

Ἴων: μέμνημαι.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑτέραν οὖσαν ἕτερα γνώσεσθαι ὡμολόγεις;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: οὐκ ἄρα πάντα γε γνώσεται ἡ ῥαψῳδικὴ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδὲ ὁ ῥαψῳδός.

Ἴων: πλήν γε ἴσως τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[540b] Σωκράτης: τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγεις πλὴν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν σχεδόν τι: ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ γνώσεται, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ἅπαντα;

Ἴων: ἃ πρέπει, οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἀνδρὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ὁποῖα γυναικί, καὶ ὁποῖα δούλῳ καὶ ὁποῖα ἐλευθέρῳ, καὶ ὁποῖα ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ὁποῖα ἄρχοντι.

Σωκράτης: ἆρα ὁποῖα ἄρχοντι, λέγεις, ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμαζομένου πλοίου πρέπει εἰπεῖν, ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς γνώσεται κάλλιον ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης;

Ἴων: οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυβερνήτης τοῦτό γε.

[540c] Σωκράτης: ἀλλ᾽ ὁποῖα ἄρχοντι κάμνοντος πρέπει εἰπεῖν, ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς γνώσεται κάλλιον ἢ ὁ ἰατρός;

Ἴων: οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Σωκράτης: ἀλλ᾽ οἷα δούλῳ πρέπει, λέγεις;

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: οἷον βουκόλῳ λέγεις δούλῳ ἃ πρέπει εἰπεῖν ἀγριαινουσῶν βοῶν παραμυθουμένῳ, ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς γνώσεται ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ βουκόλος;

Ἴων: οὐ δῆτα.

Σωκράτης: ἀλλ᾽ οἷα γυναικὶ πρέποντά ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ταλασιουργῷ περὶ ἐρίων [540d] ἐργασίας;

Ἴων: οὔ.

Σωκράτης: ἀλλ᾽ οἷα ἀνδρὶ πρέπει εἰπεῖν γνώσεται στρατηγῷ στρατιώταις παραινοῦντι;

Ἴων: ναί, τὰ τοιαῦτα γνώσεται ὁ ῥαψῳδός.

Σωκράτης: τί δέ; ἡ ῥαψῳδικὴ τέχνη στρατηγική ἐστιν;

Ἴων: γνοίην γοῦν ἂν ἔγωγε οἷα στρατηγὸν πρέπει εἰπεῖν.

Σωκράτης: ἴσως γὰρ εἶ καὶ στρατηγικός, ὦ Ἴων. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐτύγχανες ἱππικὸς ὢν ἅμα καὶ κιθαριστικός, ἔγνως ἂν ἵππους [540e] εὖ καὶ κακῶς ἱππαζομένους: ἀλλ᾽ εἴ σ᾽ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην: ‘ποτέρᾳ δὴ τέχνῃ, ὦ Ἴων, γιγνώσκεις τοὺς εὖ ἱππαζομένους ἵππους; ᾗ ἱππεὺς εἶ ἢ ᾗ κιθαριστής;’ τί ἄν μοι ἀπεκρίνω;

Ἴων: ἧι ἱππεύς, ἔγωγ᾽ ἄν.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τοὺς εὖ κιθαρίζοντας διεγίγνωσκες, ὡμολόγεις ἄν, ᾗ κιθαριστὴς εἶ, ταύτῃ διαγιγνώσκειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ἱππεύς.

Ἴων: ναί.

Σωκράτης: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ γιγνώσκεις, πότερον ᾗ στρατηγικὸς εἶ γιγνώσκεις ἢ ᾗ ῥαψῳδὸς ἀγαθός;

Ἴων: οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.

[541a] Σωκράτης: πῶς; οὐδὲν λέγεις διαφέρειν; μίαν λέγεις τέχνην εἶναι τὴν ῥαψῳδικὴν καὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἢ δύο;

Ἴων: μία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σωκράτης: ὅστις ἄρα ἀγαθὸς ῥαψῳδός ἐστιν, οὗτος καὶ ἀγαθὸς στρατηγὸς τυγχάνει ὤν;

Ἴων: μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅστις ἀγαθὸς στρατηγὸς τυγχάνει ὤν, ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥαψῳδός ἐστιν.

Ἴων: οὐκ αὖ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.

Σωκράτης: ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μὴν δοκεῖ σοι, ὅστις γε ἀγαθὸς [541b] ῥαψῳδός, καὶ στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι;

Ἴων: πάνυ γε.

Σωκράτης: οὐκοῦν σὺ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄριστος ῥαψῳδὸς εἶ;

Ἴων: πολύ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σωκράτης: ἦ καὶ στρατηγός, ὦ Ἴων, τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄριστος εἶ;

Ἴων: εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες: καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐκ τῶν Ὁμήρου μαθών.

Σωκράτης: τί δή ποτ᾽ οὖν πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Ἴων, ἀμφότερα ἄριστος ὢν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ στρατηγὸς καὶ ῥαψῳδός, ῥαψῳδεῖς μὲν περιιὼν τοῖς Ἕλλησι, στρατηγεῖς δ᾽ οὔ; ἢ [541c] ῥαψῳδοῦ μὲν δοκεῖ σοι χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἐστεφανωμένου πολλὴ χρεία εἶναι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, στρατηγοῦ δὲ οὐδεμία;

Ἴων: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡμετέρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πόλις ἄρχεται ὑπὸ ὑμῶν καὶ στρατηγεῖται καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται στρατηγοῦ, ἡ δὲ ὑμετέρα καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἄν με ἕλοιτο στρατηγόν: αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἱκανοὶ εἶναι.

Σωκράτης: ὦ βέλτιστε Ἴων, Ἀπολλόδωρον οὐ γιγνώσκεις τὸν Κυζικηνόν;

Ἴων: ποῖον τοῦτον;

Σωκράτης: ὃν Ἀθηναῖοι πολλάκις ἑαυτῶν στρατηγὸν ᾕρηνται [541d] ξένον ὄντα: καὶ Φανοσθένη τὸν Ἄνδριον καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Κλαζομένιον, οὓς ἥδε ἡ πόλις ξένους ὄντας, ἐνδειξαμένους ὅτι ἄξιοι λόγου εἰσί, καὶ εἰς στρατηγίας καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἄγει: Ἴωνα δ᾽ ἄρα τὸν Ἐφέσιον οὐχ αἱρήσεται στρατηγὸν καὶ τιμήσει, ἐὰν δοκῇ ἄξιος λόγου εἶναι; τί δέ; οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι μέν ἐστε οἱ Ἐφέσιοι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ ἡ Ἔφεσος [541e] οὐδεμιᾶς ἐλάττων πόλεως; ἀλλὰ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἰ μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις ὡς τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ οἷός τε εἶ Ὅμηρον ἐπαινεῖν, ἀδικεῖς, ὅστις ἐμοὶ ὑποσχόμενος ὡς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ περὶ Ὁμήρου ἐπίστασαι καὶ φάσκων ἐπιδείξειν, ἐξαπατᾷς με καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖς ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὅς γε οὐδὲ ἅττα ἐστὶ ταῦτα περὶ ὧν δεινὸς εἶ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν, πάλαι ἐμοῦ λιπαροῦντος, ἀλλὰ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς παντοδαπὸς γίγνῃ στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ἕως τελευτῶν διαφυγών με στρατηγὸς ἀνεφάνης, [542a] ἵνα μὴ ἐπιδείξῃς ὡς δεινὸς εἶ τὴν περὶ Ὁμήρου σοφίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τεχνικὸς ὤν, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, περὶ Ὁμήρου ὑποσχόμενος ἐπιδείξειν ἐξαπατᾷς με, ἄδικος εἶ: εἰ δὲ μὴ τεχνικὸς εἶ, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ κατεχόμενος ἐξ Ὁμήρου μηδὲν εἰδὼς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ λέγεις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ εἶπον περὶ σοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖς. ἑλοῦ οὖν πότερα βούλει νομίζεσθαι ὑπὸ ἡμῶν ἄδικος ἀνὴρ εἶναι ἢ θεῖος.

[542b] Ἴων: πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες: πολὺ γὰρ κάλλιον τὸ θεῖον νομίζεσθαι.

Σωκράτης: τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ κάλλιον ὑπάρχει σοι παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἴων, θεῖον εἶναι καὶ μὴ τεχνικὸν περὶ Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτην.